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ABSTRACT 
For close to two decades, Iran and the United States have been politically 
estranged. Comprehensive US economic sanctions have dried up most economic 
interaction. After pursuing a very tough policy of containment and isolation of 
Iran earlier in the 1990s, the Clinton administration has now invited Iran to 
engage in an official dialogue to discuss developing a road map to normalisation. 
This change of tack on the part of the United States has been prompted 
principally by the election in mid-1997 of the reformist Iranian President 
Mohammad Khatami. Iran, for its part, has so far rejected the offer of official 
dialogue, though Khatami has signaled a desire for detente and rapprochement. 
However, an increasingly discordant political atmosphere in Iran is constricting 
Khatami's room for manoeuvre. 
In this sub-thesis, I will examine Khatami's thinking and agenda, particularly his 
emphasis on detente and dialogue of civilisations in Iran 's foreign policy. I will 
look at the barriers to normalisation, including the key domestic political factors 
on both sides impeding rapprochement. I will track developments between Iran 
and the United States since Khatami took office, illuminating the significance of 
specific developments and their impact on the detente process. I will conclude 
with an assessment of why it is in the interests of the two countries to mend 
fences and an analysis of the short, medium and long-term prospects for 
n011l1alisatiol1. 
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REVIEW OF SOURCES 
My research for this sub-thesis has benefited from my extensive exposure to the 
issue through my work as a diplomat with the Australian Government. A 
research trip to Iran in April 1999 enabled me to update myself on developments 
in Iran through contacts with well-placed individuals close to the system, as well 
as with diplomatic colleagues based in Tehran. Part of the research for this sub-
thesis has been facilitated through frequent contact with a range of people in and 
around the US administration in Washington where I am currently based. 
1 have also relied on Australian diplomatic reporting for useful background and 
insights into official thinking in Tehran and Washington. I have been deliberately 
non-specific when referring to the comments and assessments of officials, as I am 
not at liberty to quote classified government documents. For this same reason, I 
have not made specific reference to these reports in my bibliography. 
There is as yet little or no published academic literature in Farsi analysing 
developments in US-Iran relations under Khatami and prospects for 
normalisation. The issue is still a somewhat taboo subject in Iran, with the 
Iranian govemment yet to explicitly acknowledge its interest in restoring 
relations with the United States. However, the Iranian press has become 
increasingly bold in running interviews and commentaries on the issue, which I 
have drawn on extensively throughout this paper. Khatami ' s writings, Hope and 
Challenge and [slam, Liberty and Development, both translated into English 
through the Institute of Global Cultural Studies at Binghamton University, 
provide a comprehensive insight into Khatami 's world view. 
On the American side, there are a range of scholarly writings on US-Iran relations, 
but these generally deal less with prospects for normalisation, concentrating more 
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on offering historical perspectives or critiquing US policy. The issue of relations 
with Iran is a politically charged one in the United States, with the result that 
many writings on recent developments contain a strong element of advocacy. 
The Israel lobby in Washington is particularly effective in ensuring the United 
States maintains a tough line on Iran, and is quite prolific in churning out 
assessments compatible with that agenda. For instance, "Iran under Khatami", a 
1998 monograph put out by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, urges 
a continuing tough US line on sanctions against Iran, reflecting the strong pro-
Israel orientation of that Institute. It fails to address adequately how domestic 
political factors on both sides are impacting on prospects for a breakthrough. 
The Nixon Center's monograph, entitled "America and Iran - Road Maps and 
Realism", authored by Geoffrey Kemp in the same year, offers arguably the most 
comprehensive survey of US-Iran relations to date, setting out in detail the range 
of barriers facing the two countries. But, like the Washington Institute 
publication, it does not deal specifically with possible timeframes and associated 
scenarios for nonnalisation, as I do in this paper. Rather, it focuses on 
advocating ways to overcome the range of identified obstacles to nonnalisation. 
Kemp's monograph does discuss aspects of the domestic political debate in Iran, 
but does not draw out sufficiently the dynamics of the debate. Kemp's 
description of the US political environment is far more comprehensive. 
In researching this sub-thesis, I have also carefully scrutinised the transcripts of 
speeches and statements by senior government figures on both sides, as well as 
US State Department and Iranian Foreign Ministry statements. Such statements 
generally represent official policy. In the case of Iran, I have also examined the 
statements of key regime figures outside the administration , particularly those of 
the leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei has final say on relations with the 
United States. Statements of such key figures also shed light on the domestic 
political currents affecting prospects for rapprochement and normalisation. 
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OVERVIEW 
The overwhelming victory of the refonnist cleric Seyed Mohammad Khatami in 
the Iranian presidential election of May 1997 over the regime's preferred 
candidate, Majles Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Noori, shocked the conservative 
rightist political establishment. The left-leaning Khatami had been allowed to run 
essentially to encourage greater voter participation and legitimise the process as 
democratic and inclusive. He was not expected to win, and certainly not by such 
an overwhelming margin. Khatami's victory raised expectations, both in and 
outside Iran, of a new era of political and social reform and democratisation, and 
of improved ties with the West, including the United States. Indeed, the past 
two years have seen Khatami, in the face of considerable domestic political 
obstructionism, achieve significant progress in advancing his domestic refornl 
agenda, while improving Iran's international standing. 
In what was seen as somewhat of a bold step, Khatami, in an interview with 
CNN in January 1998, encouraged the two countries to pursue a range of 
second-track, non-official contacts. This was widely interpreted in Washington 
as a clear signal of Iranian interest in mending fences with the Americans. 
Certainly it is consistent with Khatami's view of the importance of dialogue and 
interaction with the west and his commitment to detente as a pillar of Iranian 
foreign policy. 
Khatami's election victory and his subsequent comments prompted the United 
States to review its Iran's policy and to propose an official dialogue aimed at 
breaking down the ban'iers to detente and devising a "road map" 1 to eventual 
nornlalisation. The Americans immediately embraced Khatami's proposal for 
1 Madeleine Albright, "Transcript of Speech to Asia Society", New York, 17 Jun e, 1998 
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second-track exchanges, expecting that these would provide useful in preparing 
the way for an official dialogue. Throughout 1998 there was a flurry of activity, 
signals and gestures, but Iran has continued to reject government-to-government 
dialogue, much to the disappointment of the Americans. 
Khatami is well aware of the potential benefits of detente with the United States, 
and would probably like to move quickly to an official dialogue. However, a 
major constraint on him is the increasingly turbulent domestic political 
atmosphere in Iran where his hard-line opponents have actively sought to 
frustrate any moves towards political detente with the United States. Moreover, 
decisions on relations with the United States require the imprimatur of the leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei and other senior regime figures, most of whom are very 
wary of the ramifications of closer engagement, and unwilling to indulge 
Khatami's views on this matter. 
Such attitudes also stem from a deep distrust felt towards the United States in 
the Iranian political establishment. This is a product of the rocky history of US-
Iran relations, which would make the process of re-building confidence extremely 
arduous, even if a regime consensus to pursue this course were to be reached. 
While Khatami has managed to precipitate a partial breaking of the taboo on 
public discussion of the prospect of restoring Iran's relations with the US, his 
room to manoeuvre would be greatly expanded were there to be more unilateral 
gestures from the United States. Khatami and others have repeatedly declared 
the need for US action not simply words, if they wish to repair relations with 
Iran. Part of Khat ami's current strategy has been to work actively to expand its 
relations with the other western countries and its neighbours. He hopes this will 
generate pressure on the United States to abandon sanctions and other punitive 
containment policies unilaterally. 
The United States administration feels that it has gone far enough and that the 
ball is in Iran 's court to address key US concerns - (J.) Iranian support for 
8 
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terrorism; (2.) development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile 
delivery systems; and (3.) support for violent opposition to the Middle East 
peace process. Major unilateral gestures by the US administration, in the absence 
of a significant Iranian gesture, would be difficult to sell politically to the 
Congress and influential lobby groups. A practical difficulty for Khatami in 
relation to key US concerns is that he lacks authority over the pertinent areas of 
activity, which are largely under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) and the Leader. 
While short-term prospects for a breakthrough and the commencement of an 
official dialogue are slim, medium and longer term prospects are far better. Both 
countries realise that normalisation is in their respective national interests, and 
therefore will continue to be attentive to possibilities for a thaw in relations. 
However, the road ahead is uncertain and filled with variables. It is still not clear 
whether Khatami will prevail over hard-line forces resisting detente, although the 
evolutionary process taking place in Iranian society will ultimately drive Iran 
towards re-engagement. 
f) 
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Introduction 
Chapter One 
Khatami's Vision and Agenda 
Although Khatami does not enjoy unbridled authority in Iran's multifaceted 
power structure, his massive win in the presidential elections has given him 
considerable leeway to pressure the leader and other key regime figures to be 
more responsive to his vision and agenda. An understanding of Khatami's 
thinking is therefore crucial in gauging the broad policy direction of the regime. 
Khatami's vision of the West and how Iran should engagewith it is of particular 
importance in understanding why Khatami is interested in detente with the 
United States. 
Who is Khatami? 
Khatami has proved to be one of the most reform-minded and popular politicians 
in the post-revolutionary era. The son of an eminent and respected cleric, 
Khatami's first public appointment was as head of the Islamic Cultural Center in 
Hamburg on the eve of the revolution. He later served in the first Majles and in 
1982 was appointed Minister for Islamic Guidance in the leftist Islamist 
Mousavi government. He also held several defence- related roles during the war 
with Iraq while continuing in his ministerial post. In 1992, he resigned from his 
position as Islamic Guidance minister under pressure from hard-liners who 
accllsed him of being too lenient with censorship policy. The then prcsident, Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani subsequently appointed Khatami head of the national 
library, where be remained until his election as president in 1997. 
[0 
.. 
Khatami was put forward as a presidential candidate by the leftist clerical group, 
the Majma-ye-Rouhaniyan-e-Mobarez (MRM) or Society of Combatant Clerics 
after their preferred candidate, the non-cleric and former prime minister Mir-
Mousavi declined the nomination. The MRM and its affiliates had essentially 
been out of power since the end of the Mousavi government in 1989. According 
to insiders close to the group, the conservative rightist leadership had made it 
known that they would not accept Mir-Mousavi as a candidate, given his 
popularity, his status as a non-cleric and fears they he would deal the rightist 
establishment candidate Nategh-Noori a humiliating defeat. Khatami was then 
agreed to as a fallback candidate. The political establishment viewed him as 
someone who could give a credible performance lending legitimacy to the electoral 
process, but who lacked the high public profile and political clout to seriously 
challengeNategh-Noori. 
When Khatami quickly started to attract broad public support, particularly 
among the traditionally politically apathetic secular youth, the political 
establishment became concerned. In my travels to various provincial areas during 
the campaign in April and May 1997, I was struck by the unity of opinion of 
ordinary Iranians that Khatami was by far their preferred candidate. They were 
impressed with Khatami's reformist vision, based on the constitution and rule of 
law. Khatami had avoided a populist rabble-rousing approach to campaigning, 
presenting himself as a humble servant ready to listen to the people. In contrast, 
Nategh-Noori was seen as arrogant and paternalistic, with little to offer other 
than simply protecting the vested interests of the political establishment2 
As the election approached the political establishment became increasingly 
nervous and in the final days, both the leader and other key conservatives came 
out with some heavy and unsubtle hints to the populace to vote for Nategh-
Noori. State television on the day of the election showed a close-up of the leader 
2 Conversations with students, shopkeepers and farmers in travels around provincial Iran in April 
aDd May, 1997 
il 
writing what was clearly Nategh-Noori's name on the ballot paper. Khatami 
nevertheless swept the field, in a massive slap in the face to the political 
establishment, whose clumsy efforts to influence the electorate had back-fired 
badly. 
While Khatami was in good part the beneficiary of a massive protest vote against 
the regime, contrary to expectations, his popularity has not evaporated in the 
intervening period3. He has delivered on his undertaking to doggedly pursue an 
agenda of social and political reform based on the constitution and rule of law, 
which has won him the continuing loyalty of the electorate. The obstructionism 
of the conservatives has only served to bolster Khatami's imageas a champion of 
the people and of sweeping reform of what has increasingly come to be seen as a 
corrupt and unrepresentative system. 
But the irony is that Khatami is not a real political outsider and has always 
remained loyal to preservation of the system, based on the broad ideas laid down 
by Ayatollah Khomeini . Loyalty to the legacy of Khomeini is an important 
credential for any politician in Iran. In defending his commitment to reform, 
Khatami has emphasised Khomeini's belief in flexibility and expediency in Islamic 
governance. In his book, "Hope and Challenge", Khatami quotes Khomeini as 
follows: 
One of the greatest problems of religious leadership is the role of time and place 
in decision making. Government specifies a practical philosophy for dealing 
with sacrilege and internal and external difficulties. But these problems can not 
only not be solved by a purely theoretical view of religion but will lead us to 
dead ends and the appearance that constitutional laws have been breached. 
While you must ensure that religious infractions do not happen - and I hope 
God does not bring that day - you must focus all your effort on ensuring that 
when encountering military, social and political issues, Islam does not seem to 
lack practical uti lity4 
3 Khatami received 22 million out of roughly 29 million votes cast winning the majority in 
almost all regions oflran. A recent opinion poll published in the July 1999 issue of the monthly 
magazine Eghtessad-e-lran (Iran Economy) showed that 78 per cent of the electorate would vote 
for Khatami again in the next presidential election in 2001. 
4 Ruhollah Khomeini, "The Book of Light" (Sahifey-e Noor) Volume 21, plOD, quoted in Hope 
and Challenge, (Binghamton University Press, New York, 1998) 42 
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In this way Khatami has been able to deflect conservative criticism that he is 
selling out on the values of the revolution in pursuing far-reaching reform. 
Indeed, the conservatives, albeit grudgingly, privately concede that Khatami has 
bolstered the legitimacy of clerical rule. That being the case, the conservatives 
have continued to ferociously protect their privileged position, making Khatami's 
job more difficult. 
Taking his queue from Khomeini, Khatami has developed his own ideas about 
how best to respond to current realities to achieve a more prosperous society 
based on Islamic law. Unlike Khomeini, who preferred to emphasise a pan-
Islamist view that transcended the Persian nationalism Khomeini derisively 
associated with the Shah, Khatami is a committed nationalist, who is willing to 
acknowledge the greatness of ancient, pre-Islamic Persian civilisation. For 
instance, in a first since the 1979 revolution, his administration organised a sound 
and light show at the ruins of Persepolis, the ancient capital of the Acheminian 
empire in southern Iran on the occasion of the Persian new year in March 19995 
His emphasis on national interest and Persian pride is squarely in keeping with 
contemporary popular sentiment. 
Khatami knows that the morale of the people needs to be boosted and that they 
have to be encouraged to believe they have a real stake in the system if their 
continuing loyalty is to be ensured. Khatami is a strong advocate of the 
promotion of civil society which he believes is the key to ensuring a prosperous 
and stable society. One of Khatami's significant achievements in this regard was 
the successful holding of local council elections across the country in February 
19996• Provision had been made for such councils in the constitution, but the 
regime had never acted to implement the undertaking. In stark contrast to the 
5 This was organised by the Ministry ofIslamic Guidance. This is particularly significant as it 
was at this site in 1971 that the Shah organised a huge pageantry in celebration of2500 years of 
monarchy and Persian civilisation, an event tbat was heavily criticised by the Islamists. 
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conservatives, Khatami believes that the Government is there to serve the people, 
not the other way round7• 
As earlier mentioned, Khatami is strongly committed to the rule of law and 
tolerance of differing points of view. Under his administration, the press has 
flourished and become boldly outspoken on a range of issues which previously 
would have been largely taboo. But he and his reformist allies have had to 
weather constant attacks from conservative interests determined to shut down 
differing voices. The harsh crackdown on protesting reformist students in July 
1999 has been the most recent manifestation of attempts by hard-line 
conservatives to intimidate pro-Khatami reformists into silence. Following 
attacks on students which left at least one dead, Khatami appealed for calm, 
expressing the following view: 
it is important to guide this national consensus towards more basic affairs such 
as institutionalisation of the systcm within the framework of law and 
safeguarding people's rights and observing freedom and security with the 
objective of society's progress and consolidation of pillars of the system 8 
The consensus Khatami refers to here is consensus among the leadership in 
condemning such lawless violence. The statement indicates both Khatami's 
commitment to much-needed reform, but at the same time his interest In 
preserving unity and the system. The paradox here is that the very system he 
seeks to preserve may not be able to weather the kind of extensive reform he is 
seeking, and importantly desired by the majority of the populace. Khatami has a 
difficult balancing act and this is probably one reason he has adopted a gradualist 
and consensual approach to reform. In so doing he believes the risk of 
convulsions that might threaten the foundations of the system can be minimised. 
6 Over 100,000 local councillors were elected across the country. 
7 Khatami , "Inaugural Speech to the Iranian Majles", Tehran, 4 August, 1997 
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View of the West 
Khatami's view of the West is essentially one of qualified respect, tempered with 
a degree of wariness. Khatami accepts the view of Khomeini and orthodox 
revolutionaries that the United States, if given the chance, will again seek to 
subjugate and exploit Iran, politically and economically. In his book "Hope and 
Challenge", Khatami presents a very grim picture of Western political designs: 
Politically, the West aims to govern all comers of the world and to dominate 
the theory and practice of international relations. It possesses the material and 
symbolic resources of power simultaneously, and it will stop at nothing to 
achieve its goals and protect its interests. Our struggle with the West is of Iife-
and-death importance. In its political embodiment, the West does not wish us 
- or any people - to be independent, free, and masters of our own fate. For if 
one feature of Western imperialism is violating others' territories and 
exploiting their economics, the concomitant feature is dominating the world of 
ideas. The West propagates a worldview that lures its prey into sUbjugation9 
Khatami's thinking is reminiscent of Huntington's thesis concerning inter-
civilisational fault lines and the inevitable clash of civilisationslo. Khatami 
subscribes to the idea of the existence of several distinct civilisations, referring in 
particular to Islamic and Western civilisations. However, Khatami believes that 
civilisations can foster a lasting peaceful co-existence, and this theme has been a 
significant element informing Iran's foreign policy. At the same time, Khatami is 
primarily motivated by national interest considerations in calling for dialogue 
with the west II. He believes it is essential to understand the system of values 
and thinking underpinning Western civilisation in order to be able to utilise 
Western know how and science for the development of a prosperous Islamic 
society. Through dialogue and interaction, Iran can learn from the West, the 
dominant world civilisation, and in so doing, eventually transcend the West. 
8 Khatami, "Letter to Iranian Minister for Culture and Higher Education, Dr Moin", Tehran [ran 
News (Intell1et version) 12 July, 1999 
9 Khatall1i, Hope and Challenge (Binghamton University Press, New York, 1998) 13 
10 Samuel Huntington, The Clash 0/ Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order, 
(Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996) 
II Khatall1i called for such a dialogue with the Untied States in an intcrview with CNN in 
Tehran on 7 January 1998. He also proposed civilisational dialogue during a speech to the UN 
General Assembly in New York on 21 September, 1998 
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Khatami believes that it is unrealistic for Iran to turn its back on the West out of 
fear of domination. It is not simply a choice between total capitulation to the 
West or complete rejection. 
Ifwe must adopt the positive features of Western civilisation, simultaneously 
casting aside its deficiencies, we have no choice but to understand the West 
correctly and comprehensively in the first place. We must judge it fairly and 
objectively and learn from and use its strengths, staying clear of its defects by 
relying on our revolution ' s Islamic values. And it is obvious that this 
approach is different from a rigidly political appraisal of the West. Those who 
cannot separate the political West from the nonpolitical West are acting against 
the interests of the nation and the Islamic revolution, even though they may be 
doing so inadvertently. Here, introspection, rationality and objectivity will be 
effective, not harsh words and violence. 12 
As we see here, Khatami's view is informed by a strongly pragmatic perspective 
attuned to what is in Iran's national interests. Iran needs the West for technology 
and investment, particularly for the development of its energy sector which 
currently provides more than 80 per cent of Iran's hard currency revenues. 
Turning one's back on the West would only exacerbate Iran's current economic 
difficulties and shorten the life of the regime. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that Khatami is strongly pro-engagement with the United States on 
pragmatic national interest grounds. He knows that Iran cannot cocoon itself and 
to do so would spell disaster for the regime. His call for inter-civilisational 
dialogue reflects as much a genuine belief in a gradualist integrative approach to 
interaction with the United States as it is a shrewd political calculation that this is 
the best way to overcome deep-seated resistance in the regime to dealings with 
the United States. 
12 Khatami, Islam, Liberty and Development (Binghamton University Press, New York, 1998) 
68 
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Chapter Two 
History of US-Iran Relations: 1953-1997 
Introduction 
An awareness of the recent history of US-Iran relations is important in 
appreciating the deep legacy of grievance and mistrust between Tehran and 
Washington which hampers steps towards normalisation. 
As the leadership in Tehran has often stated, one of the key aims of the 1979 
Iranian revolution was to break the cycle of Western, particularly American, 
hegemony over Iranian affairs. The ideology of the revolution was informed by a 
strong anti-Americanism. The United States was seen as an imperialist and 
hegemonic bully which would swallow up Iran's independence if given a chance, 
as it had done during the Shah 's era. Ayatollah Khomeini himself described the 
relationship between the two countries as that of a "wolf and a sheep", with the 
US as the wolf. Such a description underscores the depth of paranoia, which has 
pervaded revolutionary thinking about US influence over Iranian affairs. 
The Iranians historically viewed the British as ultimately controlling Iran's 
destiny. Iran had been a part of the colonial powers' 'great game' of the 19th 
century in which Britain, Russia and France vied for influence in the regionl3 
The discovery of oil in the early part of the 20th century by the British led to the 
formation of the Anglo-Persian oil company, with Britain obtaining access to 
Iranian crude oil on terms heavily slanted in Britain's favour. The Second World 
War saw a decline in British influence in favour of the United States. 
13 Peter Hopkirk's The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha 
America Inc, New York, 1992) provides a comprehensive account of this period. 
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American Intrigues and Alliance with the Shah 
"lowe my throne to God, my people, my army - and to you!" -
(Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi - 21 August 1953)14 
The seminal moment in transforming Iranian perceptions of the US as the new 
power behind the throne came with CIA involvement in a 1953 coup which 
overthrew the popular nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh and 
restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power. Mossadegh had nationalised 
the oil industry and consequently become a national hero . However, concerns 
that Mossadegh might move closer to the Soviet Union at the expense of the 
United States triggered the Americans, with British help, to oust him. 
The Shah's return to power in 1953 was the beginning of a renewed alliance 
between the two Governments, with the Americans providing large amounts of 
military and civilian aid to support the Shah as part of its strategy to counter 
Soviet influence. With US support, Iran eventually became the most powerful 
regional state and the 'policeman of the Gulf , protecting Western strategic 
interests and serving as a bulwark against Soviet influence. 
The strategic value of the alliance with the Shah led the Americans largely to tum 
a blind eye to the Shah 's repressive rule and harsh treatment of political 
opposition. Even periodic American efforts in the 1960s and J 970s to coax the 
Shah to clean up his act in relation to human rights and political freedoms did not 
fundamentally affect the closeness of the relationship. The Americans had 
effectively replaced the British as the key foreign influence behind the throne, a 
status that attracted the opprobrium of those opposed to the Shah. For instance, 
14 From CIA Agent, Kelmi t Roosevelt's book. Countercoup-The Struggle for Control in f ran 
(McGraw-Hili , New York 1979) 199, quoting the Shah's words to him immediately after a 
successful CIA-ass isted coup to oust the Govern ment of nati onalist Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadegh. 
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the conclusion of a special status of forces agreement in the mid-1960s, which 
gave American service personnel in Iran inm1unity from prosecution by local 
courts, caused great ire among opposition groups, particularly Khomeini's 
Islamists. 
1979 Revolution 
The 1979 revolution caught the Americans off guard. The US Government had 
been reluctant to see the writing on the wall, underestimating the vulnerability of 
the Shah, who by then possessed one of the most powerful military machines in 
the world. It had not developed sufficient contacts with key opposition figures, 
relying too heavily on direct contacts with the Shah and his Government for 
information on developments. As former Carter administration official , Gary 
Sick describes, "the United States became the victim of its own policies. U.S. 
reliance on the shah had removed the incentives to maintain independent sources 
of information and analysis"15 
While the United States maintained its diplomatic presence in Iran, the change of 
regime marked a sharp about turn in the relationship. The radical Islamist and 
leftist revolutionaries unanimously pointed the finger at America as a hegemonic 
power, which had colluded with the Shah in oppressing the Irani an people. In 
fact only a few days after the revolutionaries seized power in February 1979, 
they attacked the U.S. Embassy taking the staff and the ambassador hostage. 
The matter was only resolved with the quick intervention of the relatively 
moderate provisional Government ofMehdi Bazargan. 
The subsequent seizure of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 by pro-
Khomeini student radicals was not so easily resolved, leading to a complete 
severing of diplomatic tics and the beginning of long years of hostility . Embassy 
15 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, (Random House, New York, 1985) 38 
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staff were held hostage for a total of 444 days. Their release coincided with the 
inauguration of President Reagan. It is clear that the crisis contributed 
significantly to the loss of the presidency by Jimmy Carter. Compounding the 
tragedy of the crisis were the accidental deaths of several US military personnel 
involved in a clandestine rescue mission in April 1980. The whole saga 
transformed Iran into an international pariah state generating widespread anti-Iran 
sentiment throughout the U.S. On the Iranian side it resulted in the resignation of 
the Bazargan government and the ascendancy of the more radical leftist lslamist 
tendency. 
Iran as a Pariah State 
Iran's pariah status in the eyes of the United States and much of the international 
community was reinforced by its active pursuit of militant export of the 
revolution and its support for radical revolutionary groups. The Islamist 
revolutionaries, many of whom had spent time in Lebanon training with 
Palestinian and Shiite Lebanese groups prior to the revolution, believed that the 
Iranian revolution would only be secure if Islamist movements in other regional 
states were encouraged to overthrow their own Western-allied governments. 
They also had a strong ideological commitment to the annihilation of Israel and 
restoration of Palestinian lands. Iranian links to a range of bombings and hostage 
takings in Lebanon through the early 1980s further hardened the US position 
towards Iran. Notable among these incidents were the bombings of the US 
Embassy in Lebanon in April 1983 and of the Marine compound in October of 
that year which killed 241 American military personnel. Following these 
incidents, in 1984 Iran was placed on the U.S. State Department ' s list of 
countries that sponsor terrorism and has remained on the list ever since. 
Since the US Export Administration Act of 1979, Iran had become subject to a 
range of US economic sanctions and prohibitions. With Iran 's placement on the 
ten·orism list, the scope of US economic sanctions against Iran increased. The 
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Reagan administration also imposed a tough arms embargo against Iran, known as 
"Operation Staunch"16 which made it increasingly difficult for the Iranians to 
obtain the necessary equipment and spare parts in their war with Iraq, which had 
begun in September 1980. American policy at the time, as with most other 
Western countries, was tilted in favour of Iraq. The Americans were happy to 
provide various forms of assistance to Baghdad, including valuable satellite 
intelligence, to help the latter' s war effort against the mullahs' regime in Tehran. 
It was widely believed at the time that without such assistance Iraq would be 
defeated by Iran. Iran's continuing links to groups in Lebanon responsible for 
seizing US hostages only served to deepen Iran's isolation and US resolve to 
bring Iran to its knees. 
In Iran, anti-Americanism continued to be a fundamental staple of revolutionary 
rhetoric. In countless rallies and speeches the U.S. was denounced as the "Great 
Satan" . The hostile rhetoric only soured the atmosphere further. 
However, as Iran began to feel the pinch of the US arms embargo in its war with 
Iraq, the leadership in Tehran realised that it could not afford to antagonise the 
Americans indefinitely. Iran's intervention in securing the release of US citizens 
in the1985 hijacking of a TWA airliner by Lebanese militants was seen by 
Washington as the first tentative signal that Iran wished to re-engagewith the 
international community 1 7 
Then, in what later became known as the Iran-Contra affair, Washington saw an 
opportunity to gain Iran's help in the release of Western hostages in Lebanon in 
exchange for the sale to [ran of desperately needed arms. The US also hoped that 
there would be scope to explore a renewed dialogue with the Iranians. This 
highly secret plan also involved the clandestine channeling of funds from the arms 
16 Geoffrey Kemp, Forever Enemies? (Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1994) 23 
17 Robyn Wright, In the Name of God. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989) 132 
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sales to the Contras in Nicaragua. However, the initiative was ultimately to 
backfire. 
The main problems with the affair were the extreme political risks on both sides 
in having such dealings, poor communications and differing expectations. Iran's 
inclusion on the list of terrorism sponsors, in effect, made such US dealings 
illegal. To make matters worse, the intermediaries used by the Americans were 
unreliable and had misrepresented the extent of Tehran's ability or willingness to 
assist in the release of the Western hostages. The domestic political environment 
in Iran at the time did not permit any Iranian official to openly declare a readiness 
to mend fences with the "Great Satan". When the whole issue eventually became 
public in 1986, including the clandestine visit to Tehran of senior US officials, it 
caused a major scandal in the US, effectively ruling out any further prospect of 
dialogue or cooperation for the remaining life of the Reagan administration. 
After the Iran-Contra affair, the Reagan administration adopted an even harder 
line with Tehran banning all Iranian imports. The United States also stepped up 
its presence in the Gulf, becoming involved in periodic skirmishes with small 
Iranian naval craft, manned by Revolutionary Guards. It also bombed Iranian 
installations in retaliation for attacks on US-flagged vessels. Iran's refusal to 
accept UN Security Council Resolution 598 of July 1987 calling for a cease-fire 
in the war with Iraq only isolated Iran further. Iran finally accepted the 
Resolution in July 1988 after major Iraqi victories were achieved with the help of 
US intelligence. 
Just prior to Iran 's acceptance of the cease-fire, a US naval vessel shot down an 
Iranian commercial airliner carrying 290 passengers over the Gulf in what 
appeared to be a case of mistaken identity. The incident occurred shortly after a 
skirmish between Iranian naval boats and the US vessel. Again this resulted in a 
massive denunciation of the United States in Iran. President Reagan's expression 
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of regret and his offer of individual compensation to the victims was dismissed as 
inadequate by the Iranians. 
Post-War and Post-Khomeini Era 
New conditions for a thaw in relations emerged after the death of Khomeini in 
June 1989 and the subsequent election of former Majles Speaker, Rafsanjani as 
president in August of that year. The radical leftist Islamist government which 
had been in power to that time was replaced by a reformist and technocratic 
administration under Rafsanjani, after amendments to the constitution abolished 
the office of prime minister, giving executive authority to the president. Such a 
sweeping reform of the structure of Government and the installation of a 
relatively junior cleric, then-Hojjatoleslam Khamenei as Khomeini's replacement, 
gave Rafsanjani a freer hand to try to end Iran's isolation. 
Rafsanjani was determined to move away from the strongly state-controlled, war-
time economy of the previous administration to a more market-oriented one. The 
priority for the Government was economic reconstruction and development after 
the devastation of the war with Iraq. Central to this strategy was attracting 
foreign investment for much-needed economic reconstruction in the post-war 
period. This required a pragmatic policy of moderation and engagement with the 
West, aimed at restoring Iran's international image. Under Rafsanjani, Iranian 
foreign policy took on a new, more moderate tack with Tran trying to recast itself 
as a responsible member of the regional and international community. 
A key issue of concern to the United States and other western countries 
throughout the 1980s had been the holding of Western hostages by Lebanese 
Islamist groups. Iran was blamed as being the principal sponsor of many of these 
groups. President Reagan had nearly come to grief over his administration's 
efforts to obtain Iranian help in the release of the hostages in exchange for arnlS. 
Indeed, the issue of hostages had dominated the final days of the Reagan 
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administration. When Bush took over he sent what was interpreted in Tehran as 
a clear signal that the United States wanted to do business with Iran. In his1989 
inauguration speech, Bush said 
there are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands, and 
Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here, and will be 
long remembered. Good will begets good will l8 
According to well-placed sources close to Rafsanjani's family circleI 9, when 
Rafsanjani took on the presidency in mid-1989, he believed that the time was ripe 
for a rapid thaw in relations with the United States. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990 was a godsend to Iran in terms of encouraging conditions for a 
breakthrough with the Americans. For the first time, Iran was replaced by Iraq as 
the regional villain and bully. Iran felt vindicated in its claims of Iraq as an 
aggressor state and was delighted to see that years of US military and political 
support for Iraq had finally backfired on US interests. The Iraqi invasion 
prompted the US to make indirect overtures to Iran for Iran to remain out of the 
conflict. 
Rafsanjani's subsequent intervention in the release of most of the remaining 
Western hostages in Lebanon at the end of 1990 and Iran's restrained and 
responsible role during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, combined with the changed geo-
strategic picture resulting from Iraq's isolation, raised expectations in Tehran that 
Iranian efforts would be rewarded with a substantial softening of US policies 
towards Iran. However, a US failure to ' reward ' Iran for its responsible behaviour 
left Rafsanjani feeling politically weakened and humiliated20 
Prospects for a thaw receded further through the remainder of Bush's term. In 
particular, Iran' s strident denunciation of the November 1991 Madrid peace 
18 Geoffrey Kemp, America and Iran -Road Maps and Realism (Nixon Center, Washington, 
1998) 42 
19 1994 conversation with president's son 
20 Kemp, America and Iran -Road Maps and Realism, 42 
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conference and its holding of a rebel conference of rejectionists; continuing signs 
of Iran's involvement in ten'orism, notably the assassinations by agents of the 
regime of several Iranian dissidents over that period, including former Prime 
Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991; and growing US concerns over 
Iran's interest in pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction 
effectively derailed prospects for early detente and rapprochement between the 
two states. 
Clinton Era Policies 
By the start of the Clinton administration in 1992, anti-Iran sentiment III 
Washington was firmly entrenched. Early in his first term, Clinton adopted a 
new policy of "dual containment"21 at the behest of the Israel lobby. The policy 
was designed to isolate and weaken both Iran and Iraq as twin pariah states. The 
Iran-Iraq Arn1s Non-Proliferation Act was introduced as part of the new policy 
in 1992, bringing in a wider prohibition on the sale of arms and the transfer of 
restricted goods and technologies, including nuclear material and technology to 
those countries. In the case of Iran, the areas of particular concern to the US 
were Iran's continuing support for terrorism; its ambitions to develop weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD); and its strident opposition to the Middle East 
peace process. 
Despite the new US policy and associated fears in Iran that the Americans were 
plotting the overthrow of the regime, Rafsanjani nonetheless remained privately 
disposed towards normalisation with Washington. He knew that normalisation 
could tum around Iran's failing economic fortunes by opening the way for large-
scale investment. Iran's awarding of an offshore gas contract to US company, 
Conoco in early 1995 was intended as another signal to the US of Iran's interest 
21 The architect of this policy was Martin Indyk, an academic at the pro-Israel Washington 
Institute of Near East Policy. Indyk was appointed to the National Security Council in charge of 
Middle East policy and then went on to serve as US ambassador to Israel. He is now Under 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. 
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in engagement. However, following complaints from the Europeans that the US 
was exercising double standards in criticising European commercial dealings with 
Iran while US companies were purchasing the lion 's share of Iranian oil , Clinton 
announced in April 1995 that he would ban all US trade with and investment in 
Iran. This forced the subsequent withdrawal of Co no co from the deal , which was 
later taken over by the French company, Total. The US rationale was that any 
help to Iran's economy would generate revenue for Iran to pursue its 
unacceptable policies, particularly its WMD development programs. 
In mid-1996, inspired by the Israel lobby, the US Congress passed a new law, the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)22, which provided for secondary sanctions 
against third countries investing more than USD40 million in the development of 
Iran's energy sector. This was in part introduced to appease disgruntled US oil 
companies, which saw their European competitors unfairly advantaged. The 
rationale for the legislation was the same as it had been for the ban on US 
commercial dealings - curbing Iran's capacity to pursue unacceptable policies and 
behaviour. It was targeted specifically at foreign investment in Iran 's energy 
sector, as this sector was where Iran derived the bulk of its hard currency 
In June 1996, a truck bomb killed 19 US servicemen in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
The finger was quickly pointed at Iran as possibly involved in the planning of the 
attack. The US administration even threatened military strikes against any 
foreign government involved in the bombing21 . This was another serious blow to 
prospects for a thaw in US-Iran relations. Besieged by growing debt and other 
economic problems and subject to stepped-up US economic sanctions and 
accusations, Rafsanjani had little room left to manoeuvre to justify unilateral 
Iranian overtures to the Americans for a thaw in relations. 
22 Also know as the D' Amato-Gilman Bill 
23 After an investigation which dragged on for close to two years, which saw the Saudis 
withdraw thei r cooperat ion from US investigat ing authorities, the Saud is dec lared in 1998 that 
there was no foreign involvement and those responsible were local Islamic extremists, opposed to 
the US military presence in Saudi Arabia. 
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The surprise election of Khatami in May 1997 prompted the Americans to 
conduct a major policy review to see how the United States might respond to the 
changing political environment in Tehran and the emergence of a popular figure 
committed to political refolm and liberalisation and a foreign policy of detente. 
While the policy review did not result in a lifting or easing of US sanctions, the 
emphasis was shifted from one of weakening and isolating Iran into submission, 
to one of simultaneously sanctioning and encouraging Iran to modify its 
behaviour and come to the negotiating table. 
Conclusion 
Overcoming the deep wall of mistrust which has developed over many years is 
no easy task. While sanctions have hurt Iran, they have not brought about the 
desired changes in Iranian behaviour sought by the United States. In the 
following chapters I will look at the Khatami era and how the US appears to be 
casting around for new ways to encourage Iran to come to the table. In the next 
chapter I will deal with Khatami's foreign policy, which has been lauded as highly 
successful both in improving Iran's international standing and placing pressure on 
the United States to abandon its hard-line policies towards Iran. 
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Chapter Three 
Foreign Relations under Khatami: From Discord to Detente 
Introduction 
Geo-politics is an important factor in Iran 's foreign policy, given Iran's location 
in a region supplying a large percentage of the world's energy reserves and its 
own importance as an oil exporter. Iran believes it has a central role to play in 
the security affairs of the region, a role that has largely been denied it since the 
1979 revolution. Coupled with this is Iran's strongly-felt need to protect its 
independence, territorial integrity and national interests in the face of what it sees 
as western, particularly US, designs to exert undue influence over the country's 
affairs. Historical experience has made Iran particularly sensitive on this latter 
point, particularly the current regime 24 Indeed, achieving independence was a 
key theme of the revolution. However, Iran realises that engagement with the 
west remains essential to Iran's national interests, particularly development of its 
economy. 
I have already examinedKhatami's thinking regardingengagementwith the west. 
Khatami's 1997 election generated wide expectations, in and outside Iran, that he 
would move decisively to bring Iran back into the mainstream international 
community. As I have explained, similar expectations were raised after 
Rafsanjani became president in 1989. However, he was never able to achieve a 
true breakthrough in Iran's relations with the west, least of all with the United 
States. In addition, he had only moderate success in improving relations with 
Iran's Gulf neighbours, which remained dogged by an undercurrent of mistrust 
24 See Anoushiravan Ehteshami's chapter, "The Foreign policy of Iran" in Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch's Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System. (Routledge, 
London, 1997) 27-56 
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and a range of significant irritants. In this chapter I will focus on Khatami's main 
successes on the foreign policy front and the reason he has been able to make 
much more progress than his predecessor in raising Iran's international standing. 
will also look at how Iran's current foreign policy is informed partly by a 
strategic interest in pressuring the US to moderate its hard-line stance towards 
Iran. 
Before looking in detail at the US and Iran and what has transpired since 
Khatami's ascent, it is useful to examine developments in key areas of Iran's 
foreign relations, which have some impact on prospects for US-Iran 
rapprochement. 
Progress under Khatami 
Essentially, there has been little departure in Iran's broad foreign policy direction 
under Khatami from that of his predecessor. Like Rafsanjani, Khatami holds that 
Iran must put its national interests first in order to build a strong and prosperous 
nation. Good relations with the west are essential to this aim, given the global 
economic and political dominance of the United States and the west. 
Furthermore, Khatami recognises the need for good relations with the Muslim 
world, to bolster the credibility of Iran's experiment with Islamic government and 
to demonstrate the regime's commitment to Islamic solidarity. There is also a 
strategic imperative in seeking improved relations with Iran's neighbours. 
Khatami rejects the notion that Iran should pursue a militant export of the 
revolution and take a gratuitously hard line against any country that displays 
pro-Western, pro-US leanings. That approach in the early years of the revolution 
turned Iran into an international pariah. Iran now places great store on increasing 
its international standing. In his first speech after his election, Khatami indicated 
his desire to pursue a policy of detente regionally and globally25 However, while 
25 Mohammad Mahallati, "Referendum for Change" in [ran s Elections: Implications for us 
Policy (Middle East Institute, Washington , 1997) 12 
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Rafsanjani laid the groundwork, he was unable to take full advantage of the 
opportunities or effect the kind of progress that Kbatami has achieved since he 
took office in mid-1997. 
So why has Kbatami been able to achieve real progress towards improving Iran's 
international standing and relations with key countries, when Rafsanjani failed? 
Kbatami's relative success in pursuing his foreign policy agenda so far is 
attributable to a number of important factors. Firstly, he has been able to cast 
himself as a fresh face in the regime (though he is not), as a reformer determined 
to achieve real change both domestically and in the international sphere. He has 
also been able to project himself as sincere and statesmanlike. This image, 
combined with his often-stated commitment to reducing tensions and building 
better relations with the international community, has evoked a very positive 
response from much of the international community. Another important factor 
has been the replacement of the long-serving, but ineffectual foreign minister Ali 
Velayati , who while enjoying the patronage of the leader Ayatollah KJ1amenei , 
presided over a bloated and inefficient foreign ministry. Velayati ' s successor, 
Kamal Kbarrazi, appointed by Kbatami, has been able to inject a new sense of 
purpose into the foreign ministry and introduce much-needed reform. 
Kbatami has also been the beneficiary of good timing. For instance, Iran 's 
hosting of the Eighth Organisation of Islamic Conference Summit in December 
1997 and its subsequent assumption of the ore; Chair proved a major turning 
point in the level ofIran's acceptance in the Muslim world. It provided Kbatami 
with an important platform to present his moderate vision of Muslim solidari ty 
and cooperation as a force for peace and stability in the world. The OIC Summit 
paved the way for an accelerated improvement in relations with a range of 
important Muslim countries, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. The 
hosting of the summit allowed many Islamic heads of state, heads of government 
and/or senior ministers to gain a first hand experience ofIran. In addition, Iran, as 
OIC Chair, has been placed in a leadership and mediating role , most recently in 
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relation to Kosovo, thereby enhancing its credentials as a responsible 
international player. 
Apart from his interest in seeking a thaw with the United States, Khatami has 
paid particular attention to two main spheres in Iran's foreign relations - the 
European Union and its regional relations, particularly the Gulf states, central 
Asia and the southern Caucasus. 
Relations with the European Union 
Khatami 's commencement in office in August 1997 provided the trigger for a new 
improved phase in EU-Iran relations. By way of background, in April 1997 a 
German court had delivered a verdict against four defendants, including one 
Iranian, for the killing of a Kurdish dissident leader in Germany in 1992. To 
make matters worse for the Iranians, the court had implicated the Iranian 
leadership in the planning of the assassination. The ruling resulted m an 
immediate withdrawal ofEU and other western ambassadors, a suspension of the 
regular 'critical dialogue' process 26 between Iran and the EU, and a general 
souring of relations. Khamenei, who has the final say of most issues, including 
foreign policy, had also weighed in to the dispute complicating Iranian Foreign 
Ministry attempts to resolve the matter and put relations back on track. 
However, the change in administration provided both sides with the opportunity 
to start afresh, symbolised by the return of ambassadors soon after Khatami's 
inauguration. 
Since then there has been a gradual build up in high-level exchanges leading up to 
the most senior western visit to Iran since the revolution, that of then Italian 
26 This was a dialogue instituted by the EU in the early 1990s to provide a forum to discuss a 
range ofEU concems about Iranian behaviour and policies, including the 1989 Khomeini Fatwa 
against Bri tish author, Salman Rushdie. It was the central feature of an EU policy of constructive 
engagement with Iran, which allowed commerce to proceed while political contacts were more 
circumscribed and calibrated to Iranian behaviour and the political climate between the two sides. 
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Prime Minister Prodi in July 1998. Khatami himself visited Italy in March 1999 
and both France and Gelmany have since invited Khatami to visit. The Khatami 
Government has also managed to normalise diplomatic ties with Britain, 
following an agreement reached on the fatwa against British author, Salman 
Rushdie27 . Under the agreement the Iranian Government gave an undertaking that 
it would not carry out or assist anyone to carry out the death sentence on 
Rushdie. 
As we have seen, Khatami ' s interest in engaging the EU is firmly rooted in 
Iranian national and strategic interests. In the absence of relations with the 
United States, Iran has a vital need for EU investment and technology, 
particularly in Iran's energy sector, which provides 80 per cent of Iran's hard 
currency revenues. Without such investment, there is a danger that Iran's 
economy might collapse with ramifications for the survival of the regime. While 
the whole issue of relations with the West and foreign investment has, over the 
years, caused much internal debate over questions of economic independence and 
sovereignty, there is now a broad consensus in the Iranian leadership that the 
benefits of improved relations and accompanying Western investment and 
technology far outweigh any potential pitfalls of engagement with the West. 
This consensus was largely achieved during the Rafsanjani presidency. Already 
Iran has awarded several important tenders in its oil and gas sector to EU 
companies. 
Another important factor for Khatami in seeking closer ties with the EU is a 
strategic interest in isolating the United States in its hard-line stance on economic 
sanctions. While most EU countries share US concerns about aspects of Iranian 
behaviour, they argue that isolating Iran economically would have a more negati ve 
than positive impact, and that the path to achieving desirable change in Iran is 
through economic and political engagement. While this stance is motivated 
27 In FeblUary 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued fatwa (edict) calling for Rushdie to be put to 
death for apostasy over all egedly blasphemous passages in his novel, "The Satanic Verses". 
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largely by European economic self-interest, driving a wedge between the US and 
the rest of the West in this regard serves Iran's interests. Improved Iran-EU 
relations highlight the failure of US containment policies and turns the tables on 
the US. Iran anticipates that US business interests will become its allies in 
pressuring the US administration to ease Washington's tough stance towards Iran. 
Indeed, Conoco, the US oil company which was denied the contract in 1995, has 
been a major force behind the formation of a business lobby known as "USA 
Engage" which advocates the abandonment of sanctions as a tool of foreign 
policy. In a recent article, Conoco president, Archie Dunham came out strongly 
against sanctions which he said were hurting American interests28 
Relations with the Gulf States 
Iraq's 1990 misadventure in Kuwait and its continuing isolation have continued 
to provide Iran with a strategic opportunity to build up closer relations with 
GCC states. For years GCC states were extremely wary of Iranian intentions, 
mindful of Iran's past actions and view of itself as the natural leader of the Gulf 
region. Khatami has made great advances in improving Iran relations with all 
GCC states, with the notable exception of the United Arab Emirates, which 
remains at odds with Iran over the sovereignty of three small Gulf islands. While 
GCC states will continue to treat Iran warily, most have seen Khatami 's election 
as an opportunity to build genuinely cooperative relations with Iran. The May 
1999 visit of Khatami to Saudi Arabia and Qatar was a major turning point in this 
respect. Khatami's visit to Saudi Arabia, following the visit to Iran by the Saudi 
Defence Minister and earlier the Crown Prince, has been a significant confidence-
building exercise. 
28 Archie Dunham, "Sanctions Against Iran and Others are Hurting American Interests" Middle 
East Insight, May-June, 1999 55. Also, USA Engage chief coordinator, Rod MacAlister, sa id in 
July, 1999 that the group was planning to intensify its lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill for a 
Ii fling of sanctions. 
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Improved relations with the GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, serve important 
Iranian economic and strategic interests. Despite frequent statements in favour of 
greater diversification in exports and a move away from almost sole reliance on 
oil, the regime in Tehran is well aware that oil will continue to be the mainstay of 
the Iranian economy for years to come. The severe drop in oil prices through 
1998 buffeted the Iranian economy, highlighting just how vulnerable it is to oil 
price fluctuations. There is now a strong consensus in the Iranian system that 
good relations with major OPEC partners, particularly with its largest producer, 
Saudi Arabia, are essential to Iran's own economic security. A deal done with the 
Saudis in March 1999 on reducing OPEC production levels greatly assisted a 
subsequent price recovery, which has given Iran some economic breathing space. 
Iran's strong interest in a reduction in or complete withdrawal of US and other 
Western forces in the Gulf is an important strategic aim in seeking improved 
relations with the Gulf states and securing a role for itself in regional security 
arrangements. Iran believes that while the US remains in the Gulf it will be 
extremely difficult for Iran to play such a role. Iran is a strong advocate of 
regional self-reliance in security. To quote Khatami on the subject, 
We demand the unconditional withdrawal of foreign navies and forces from the 
region. We believe that the security and advancement of the region should be 
achieved by the people, nations and governments of the region29 
Iran is genuinely concerned and frustrated by the continuing US military presence 
in the Gulf. It sees the US as both feeding a regional arms build-up and blocking 
the development of intra-regional security arrangements which include Tehran. 
However, Tehran will have a tough job in convincing its GCC neighbours to put 
their complete faith in Iran. All remain very sceptical of getting into bed with the 
Iranians, even though some, like Saudi Arabia, have been publicly encouraging of 
an Iranian security role. No GCC state has any immediate plans to abandon the 
insurance of a US and Western military presence - paliicularly while Saddam 
29 Khatami, Hope and Challenge, (Binghamton University Press, New York, 1998) 97 
34 
remains in power in Baghdad. Iran privately understands the reality of the GCC 
position and Iran's calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces are more an 
expression of a longer term hope than a genuine expectation. Nevertheless Iran 
will keep plugging away to highlight its stance and keep the pressure on the 
United States to openly acknowledge the legitimacy of Iranian aspirations in this 
regard. 
The stance of Saudi Arabia, as the largest Gulf monarchy, is particularly 
important to Iran in its quest to promote a role for itself in regional security 
arrangements. This is partly why Iran has directed such intense diplomatic effort 
to improving ties with Saudi Arabia, and its efforts have yielded some results. 
Although Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi ' s description of Khatami's May 
1999 visit to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Qatar as "ushering in a new era in Arab-
Iranian ties"30 may be a little exaggerated, there has been a qualitative shift in 
relations with Riyadh and clear signals that the Saudis are willing to be receptive 
to the idea of a security role for Iran. An important signal was the visit of the 
Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan Bin- 'Abd-al- 'Aziz, to Iran in early May 
1999. 
While the Saudis have not agreed to an Iranian proposal for a joint defence pact, 
they recognise a legitimate security role for Tran in the region. When asked 
recently by a London-based Arabic newspaper whether he believed Iranian 
armament capabilities, especially missile capabilities, are a threat to Saudi Arabia 
and the Arab States in the Gulf, Prince Sultan replied: "That should be said by 
foreigners. As for us, we say that Iran ' s strength is a strength for Muslims"3l 
Shortly after Khatami's visit, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, in an intervi ew with 
the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper, described the two countries as 
having achieved "quantitative and qualitati ve progress in bilateral relations", 
30 "Kamal Kharrazi Interview" Cairo al-Ahram al- 'Arabi, 29 May, 1999 
31 "Saudi Defence Minister Interview" London AI-Hayah , 5 May, 1999 
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depicting this as "an achievement for us both and for the entire region". Asked 
about Iran's military ambitions, Prince Abdullah defended Iran: 
Iran has every right to develop its defence capabilities for its security without 
hanning others. We also do the same. All countries follow the same policy, 
then why only Iran is singled out here without mentioning others. Why don't 
you ask about the Israeli armament and its unl imited weapons development 
program32 
Such comments by an erstwhile rival are music to Iranian ears. It is noteworthy 
that the question of an Iranian connection to the 1996 Dhahran bombing in Saudi 
Arabia now appears to have been dropped from the agenda. In the past the 
Saudis had insisted to the Americans that there was an Iran connection33 , but 
they later ruled out foreign involvement. The change in stance was widely 
interpreted as motivated by Saudi reluctance to reveal a link to Iran at a time of 
improving relations with Tehran. The US, frustrated with the conduct of the 
Saudi investigation, has since focused on Osama bin Laden as the prime suspect 
in the case. 
Iranian efforts to reclaim its place in regional affairs and to gain support for an 
exclusive regional security cooperative will continue to be hampered by its 
islands' dispute with the UAE. The UAE has watched the Saudi-Iran 
rapprochement with some consternation, as it believes the islands dispute has 
been shunted aside by the Saudis and other Gee states. The Gee has 
traditionally, if not informally, linked resolution of this issue to substantive 
improvement in relations with Iran. The erosion of that linkage has alarmed the 
UAE. Iran for its part, while claiming its interest in improved ties with the UAE, 
has shown little willingness to compromise on its claim of sovereignty over the 
islands. While many of the Gee states have their own territorial disputes 34, 
32 Reulers [nlernet, I June, 1999 
33 Philip Shenon and David Johnston "u.S.-Saudi Inquiry Into '96 Bombing is Falling Apart" 
The New York Times, 21 June, 1998 
34 See R. Litwak's monograph, Sources of liller-State Conflict, (International Insititute for 
Strategic Studies, published by Gower, Aldershot, UK, 1981) for a comprehensive account of the 
range of territorial disputes in the Gulfregion. 
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Iran, as a non-Arab state with a history of hegemonic policies in the region, will 
find that the strategic advantage of having possession of the islands may 
eventually be outweighed by the damage the issue does to Iran's broader strategic 
objectives - i.e., achieving both a withdrawal of Western military forces and a 
central role for itself in regional security arrangements. 
Relations with Iraq 
What transpires in Iraq is another important issue with ramifications not only for 
Gee-Iran relations, but importantly for Iran ' s economic fortunes and the 
rapprochement with the United States. In terms of regional security, a resolution 
of the Iraq problem would, in Iranian thinking, remove the immediate justification 
for a continuing Western military presence in the Gulf. Having said that, Iran 
would be concerned if resolution of the issue meant the replacement of Saddam 
with a pro-Western regime and/or the break-up of Iraq. This could not only end 
Iran's honeymoon with Gee states, but create new regional instabilities and 
concerns in Iran about encirclement and isolation at the hands of the US and allied 
states. Economically, any lifting of sanctions on Iraq, with or without a change 
of regime in Baghdad, would impact adversely on Iran. There would be a short-
term fall in oil prices and, more importantly, Iran ' s attractiveness as a foreign 
investment destination could be eclipsed by the plethora of opportunities on 
offer in Iraq. Another Iranian concern is that a resolution of the Iraq problem 
could prompt the US to adopt an even more heavy-handed approach to Iran. 
Meanwhile, Iran ' s approach to Iraq will continue to be a case of ' better the devil 
you know than the devil you don ' t'. Iran will keep trying to achieve a solid 
working relationship with Iraq, concentrating on bilateral issues of mutual interest 
while reaping the benefits ofIraqi isolation. However, complete normalisation is 
lU1likely while Saddam remains in power. 
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Relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus 
Iran's economic and strategic interests have also dictated an active policy of 
constructive engagement with its northern neighbours in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Economically, Iran hopes to become the gateway to this region, 
benefiting not only from transit trade but also serving as a supplier of goods and 
services. Importantly, the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the region, 
including the Caspian, has opened up new opportunities for Iran to participate in 
both the exploitation and transfer of reserves. However, Iran lacks the capital to 
invest in these countries and has been faced with competition from Turkey, 
Russia and, importantly, the United States, for influence. US opposition to the 
routing of pipelines through Iran, despite the favourable economics of the Iran 
route, has been frustrating for Iran. Iran has therefore, sought to present itself as 
a responsible and reliable regional player in an effort to convince both Central 
Asian governments and the large oil and gas consortia that US policy in this 
regard is misplaced. The oil companies, for their part, need little convincing of 
the economic logic of routing pipelines through Iran and US companies involved 
in the region have complained bitterly to the US administration over its pipeline 
policy. 
Countering US 'Encirclement' 
Strategically, Iran feels threatened by the growing US and Israeli influence in 
Central Asia in addition to the US presence in the Gulf. Some in Iran are 
convinced that the US and Israel are seeking to encircle Iran in an effort to contain 
and weaken it. Turkey's membership of NATO and its military cooperation 
with Israel only reinforce this perception. Iran has been careful to cultivate solid 
ties with Moscow, in part to counter the defacto US alliance against it. 
In addition, Iran is convinced that the Taleban in Afghanistan are a phenomenon 
somehow encouraged by the United States. Iran's active participation in the 
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affairs of the region, both bilaterally and as a member of the Economic 
Cooperation Organisation, and its active participation in regional and 
international efforts to resolve the long-running conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan demonstrate its determination to avoid containment and isolation. 
Conclusion 
Despite the progress it has made with the EU and most of its regional neighbours 
towards imporved relations, it is clear that Iran's continuing enmity with the 
United States is a key limiting factor in its efforts to improve its international 
standing and, more importantly, its economy. Iran recognises that the US can 
and will continue to playa spoiling role in treating Iran as a hostile state which 
must be curtailed and contained. Hence, Iran will continue to devote considerable 
energy to courting other western countries and building up its credentials as a 
responsible regional player, in an effort to highlight the ineffectiveness of US 
hard-line policies towards Iran. In the next chapter, I will discuss the barriers to 
normalisation between Iran and the United States, dividing them into declared 
barriers and political obstacles. 
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Chapter Four 
Iran and the United States: Barriers to Normalisation 
Introduction 
As we have seen, the history of US-Iran relations has left a difficult legacy of 
suspicion and mistrust. Both sides have referred to this "wall of mistrust" which 
needs to be breached if relations are ever to be restored. Indeed, building up 
confidence and trust is essential to overcoming the range of barriers to 
normalisation. Before we look in detail at developments in US-Iran relations in 
the Khatami period in the next chapter, it is useful firstly to detail the range of 
declared barriers to normalisation which have been publicly raised by each side, 
and to highlight the differing perspectives of the two countries. This chapter also 
examines the domestic political impediments to normalisation, which arguably are 
more difficult to overcome - particularly on the Iran side - than the declared 
barriers. 
Declared Barriers 
Since the beginning of the first Clinton administration, US policy towards Iran 
has remained fundamentally unchanged in its broad objective of pressuring Iran to 
change certain policies and behaviour. The United States has repeatedly 
identified the principal problem areas as 
Iran 's program of development of weapons of mass destruction 
Iran 's support for terrorism 
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Iran's opposition to and obstruction of the Middle East Peace Process.35 
Iran's poor human rights record and, more recently, Iranian efforts to develop a 
medium-range missile capability, have also been identified as additional areas of 
key concern. The United States has linked a lifting of sanctions and 
normalisation to resolution of these identified areas of concern. But the US has 
made it clear that it is ready to sit down with the Iranians immediately to discuss 
these concerns, as well as any Iranian grievances against the United States. The 
holding of a dialogue is not contingent on resolution of these issues. This 
invitation represents a readjustment of previous US policy, which was simply to 
demand changes in Iranian behaviour and to employ pressure to try to compel 
Iran to comply. 
Apart from taking issue with America's specified concerns, Iran has a number of 
its own grievances about US behaviour and policies. The specific concerns raised 
by Iran are 
US economic pressures against Iran - including sanctions, the non-return of 
disputed assets, exertion of influence on international financial institutions to 
Iran's detriment, impeding of technology transfer and opposition to pipelines 
through Iran 
US efforts to sabotage Iran's role in regional security 
One-sided US support for Israel 
Interference in Iranian internal affairs, particularly the allocation by the US 
Congress of a budget to undermine the Government of Iran 
US villainisation ofIran and its failure to acknowledge past injustices against 
Iran. 
35 "US State Department Press Briefing", 6 January, 1998 
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WMD and Missile Development 
Iran ' s possession of chemical weapons stocks 36 and strong indications that it is 
attempting to gain a nuclear, and possibly biological , weapons capability continue 
to alarm the United States, Israel and their allies. Recent Iranian testing of 
medium range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel has increased that sense 
of alarm, particularly when coupled with US/Israeli predictions that Iran could 
have a nuclear weapon within five to ten years. This is probably the number one 
issue of concern for Washington. 
Iran, of course, vigorously denies the existence of a clandestine WMD 
development program. It justifies its missile development program as part of a 
strategic defence, and not intended to be used offensively. In reality, such a 
strategic capability is a cheaper option to conventional armament to the level 
necessary to deter Israel and the US. 
Iran takes particular issue with the restriction of technology transfer, accusing the 
United States and the West of impeding its legitimate economic development. 
For instance, it periodically complains about the additional export controls 
imposed by Australia Group members (largely developed countries) on transfer 
of dual-use chemicals beyond the lists annexed to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), to which Iran is a signatory. Iran claims that, as a party to 
the CWC, it should not be penalised by additional onerous restrictions. 
Similarly, in relation to transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, Iran, as an 
identified threshold state, has fallen foul of unilateral actions taken by the Nuclear 
Supplier Group to limit transfers. Iran is very frustrated by what it sees as a 
violation of its ri ghts as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and 
36 According to the CIA Nonproli feratio n Center, lran has continued to upgrade and expand its 
CW prodcution infrastructure, even after its s igning of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
January 1993. Quoted in the monograph by P. DeSutter. Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring 
Iranian Use of NBC Weapons. (National Defense University Press, Washington 1997) 48 
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US double standards, both in refusing Iran the kind of deal it gave North Korea to 
develop its civilian nuclear industry (not that Iran has ever asked for such a deal) 
and US silence on Israel 's nuclear weapons program3 7 US administration 
officials admit privately that America is indeed exercisinga double standard, and 
going beyond international norms in restricting Iranian access to all manner of 
nuclear technology. Such a stance reflects the level of US distrust of Iranian 
intentions. The US Congress is also particularly hawkish on this issue of 
sensitive technology transfer. In July 1999 the Congress voted overwhelmingly 
to withhold funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency, unless the US 
Secretary of State could certify that IAEA assistance to Iran would not assist it 
to gain access to nuclear weapons or nuclear technology38 
The issue of WMD is a thorny one but not insurn10untable. US intelligence 
reports leave little doubt that Iran is pursuing some kind of program for the 
development of WMD. But this is hardly surprising, inasmuch as Iran is not 
about to abandon what it sees as a strategically vital program while surrounded 
by countries with such capabilities, and while feeling threatened both by the US 
military presence in the Gulf and a nuclear-capable Israel. Indeed Iran is gaining 
some strategic mileage in keeping its adversaries guessing about its actual 
capabilities. 
Terrorism 
Terrorism is a politically charged issue with both sides doggedly trying to claim 
the moral high ground. As mentioned earlier, Iran has been on the US State 
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1984, and until this year 
was listed as the number one sponsor. 
37 Kemp, America alld Iran - Road Maps alld Realism. 58 
38 Known as the Menendez Bill. Passed on 19 July, 1999 by 38 3-\. The United States currentl y 
provides 25 per cent of the lAEA's budget. 
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The Iranians have assiduously defended themselves against US accusations, 
pointing out that Iran is a victim of terrorism. The problem is partly one of 
definition, which sharpens the differences between the two sides on this issue. 
Iran has repeatedly accused the US of double standards, on the grounds that it is 
a major sponsor of 'state terrorism', referring in particular American backing for 
Israeli actions against the Palestinians and Lebanese Hizbullah. Iran has also 
accused the US of harbouring violent Iranian opposition elements, namely 
members of the Mujaheddin Al Khalgh Organisation (MKO). 
US intelligence reports indicate that Iran is indeed assisting violent rejectionist 
groups and elements connected with the regime have probably been responsible 
for the assassinations of a number of opposition elements abroad. Iran, on the 
other hand, believes that its support for rejectionist groups does not constitute 
support for terrorism. While it does not admit to attacks against opposition 
figures, it would see assassinations of MKO members as executing swift justice 
against those who have killed and maimed Iranians, or are engaged in treasonable 
activities. 
A major sticking point with the United States is over Iran's assistance to 
rejectionist groups and Lebanese Hizbullah, which the US identifies as terrorist 
groups. While Iran has scaled back the level of its financial assistance to these 
groups in recent years, it is unlikely to abandon them altogether, despite the 
continuing damage it does to Iran ' s standing with the United States. There are a 
range of religious and other linkages between key parts of the regime and 
rejectionist groups going back to the 1960s and 1970s. The empathy felt for the 
Palestinians and Lebanese Shiites is genuine and it would be difficult for the 
Khatami administration to choke off completely the flow of fund ing and 
assistance from Iran. A signi ficant breakthrough in the Middle East peace 
process, particularly an accommodation between Syria and Israe l and an Israe li 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon would make it easier for Khatami to push for 
a cessation or massive reduction in Iranian military and financial ass istance to 
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rejectionist groups and the Lebanese Hizbullah , in the interests of mending fences 
with the United States. 
This whole issue of terrorism is further complicated by the sensitivity of the 
intelligence, making it difficult for the Americans and others to offer publicly the 
evidence at their disposal to demonstrate undeniable proof of Iranian support for 
such groups. The other factor is the complexity of the Iranian system and the 
uncertainty as to what extent terrorist-related activity is state-sponsored or state-
sanctioned. 
Opposition to the Middle East Peace Process 
US concerns over Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process centre 
around alleged Iranian support to Lebanese Hizbullah and the various rejectionist 
groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, rather than simply the fact of Iran's 
opposition to the process per se. 
The prominence of the issue for the US stems from the close US-Israeli alliance 
and the strong influence of the Israel lobby on US policy on Iran. Iran 's 
continuing refusal to accept Israel's right to exist and its historic commitment to 
Israel's annihilation only heightens the sensitivity of this issue for the United 
States. 
In recent years, Iran has continually denied it is attempting to obstruct the peace 
process, claiming that it has a right to oppose the process, which it sees as 
unjustly tilted towards Israel, and as ignoring the Palestinian diaspora. A 
substantial breakthrough on the peace process would probably see the United 
States and Iran reach an accommodation on this issue. 
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iran's Human Rights Record 
Like most other Western countries, the US has been a vocal critic of Iran's human 
rights record for many years. Of particular concern has been the lack of due 
process, high number of executions, oppression of women and poor treatment of 
religious minorities, in particular Bahais and Jews. The US has co-sponsored the 
yearly UN resolutions in Geneva and New York expressing concern over Iran's 
human rights record. Having said that, this is more of a second-tier issue for the 
United States, because human rights in Iran do not impinge directly on US 
interests nor those of Israel. 
Iran in tum has accused the US of political motivations in its criticism of Iran 
over human rights. While being careful not to adopt a culturally relativist 
position on human rights, Iran has nonetheless vigorously defended its record, 
saying that it observes human rights consistent with Islamic principles. 
US Economic Pressures against fran 
This is probably Iran's central grievance against the United States and probably 
the most difficult hurdle to overcome in the short to medium term. It is hard to 
see much forward movement towards dialogue and rapprochement, while the 
United States persists in a calculated policy to contain, weaken and isolate Iran. 
Current US policy maintains that sanctions and other economic pressures need to 
be maintained on Iran to force it to modifY unacceptable aspects of its behaviour, 
or at least to compel it to agree to sit down and discuss US concerns, ahead of 
any sanctions relief. 
Iran, for its part, sees the sanctions as a US attempt to undermine the Islamic 
republic and re-assert hegemony over Iran. Iranian pride and cun'ent domestic 
political circumstances are unlikely to permit Iran to come to the table while such 
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sanctions are in place, even though sanctions have hurt Iran39. This would be 
seen as a capitulation to US heavy-handedness. 
The US claims that Iran's constant calls for the US to unlock Iran's disputed 
assets are misplaced. The United States has made it clear that there are no US 
holdings ofIranian funds provided for undelivered military equipment as has been 
suggested. (Iran had filed claims during the 1980s before the US-Iran claims 
tribunal in the Hague seeking billions of dollars for alleged US overcharges and 
non-deliveries of military equipment under the US foreign military sales program 
with Iran prior to the revolution. Those claims are still under active arbitration at 
the Tribunal. Decisions on them will be issued by the Tribunal.) However, Iran 
has also filed claims for billions of US dollars worth of property in the US 
allegedly owned by the late Shah and his fanlily. This matter is currently under 
separate legal contest. 
US Efforts to Sabotage Iran 's Role in Regional Security 
This issue is linked to the US military presence in the Gulf, which Tehran 
perceives as undermining its security and ambition to play what it sees as its 
rightful leadership role in the security of the region. Iran is also concerned about 
the large-scale arms transfers to Iran's neighbours across the Gulf'lo, arguing that 
such sales and the continuing US presence only exacerbate tensions and 
insecurity. Having said that, Iran knows that the US plays a central role in 
containing Iraq and keeping Saddam weak. 
The US, for its part, sees its continuing presence in this oil-rich region at this 
time as vital to its own national security interests and to its policy of 
containment of what it sees as the military and strategic ambitions of both Iran 
39 See J. Amuzegar's article, "fran's Economy and the US Sanctions" Middle East Journal, 51-2 
Spring 1997, pp 185-199 
40 Kemp, America and Irall: Road Maps alld Realism, 49 
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and Iraq. Iran 's opposition to the US presence in the Gulf would largely 
evaporate as an issue of contention, were there to be a rapprochement which 
involved Iran being brought into a regional security framework. US officials 
privately acknowledge that this option has not been entirely ruled out, but they 
expect it would be a slow evolution41 Although Iran does not admit it publicly, 
it is resigned to a continuing US presence in the Gulf, at least into the foreseeable 
future. Therefore, it would probably be responsive to entering a regional security 
cooperative framework, which involved the US, as part of a broader confidence 
building exercise. 
One-sided US supportfor Israel 
Iranian accusations of US partiality towards Israel are more part of the rhetorical 
war, where Tehran endeavours to highlight US double standards, in defence of 
Iran's hard-line position on the Middle East peace process. In reality, Iran is 
reconciled to the fact that the United States will continue in its strong support of 
Israel, not least because Iran appreciates the strength of the Israel lobby in 
Washington. This is not an issue that will provide a real hurdle to dialogue, 
particularly with a full or partial resolution of the Middle East peace process. 
Such a resolution would prompt Iran to tone down the anti-Israel rhetoric, 
improving the atmosphere for rapprochement. 
Interference in Iranian Internal Affairs 
The particular issue for the Iranians is the 1995 allocation by the US Congress of 
a $20 million contingency fund to undermine the Iranian Government. While Iran 
is aware that this was little more than a political stunt by former Republican 
Congressional Speaker Newt Gingrich, and is not part of administration policy, 
which accepts the Islamic Republic as the legitimate Government of Iran, it is 
4\ Private comments of White House official in June 1999 
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nonetheless viewed by the Iranians as a bl atan t example of attempted US 
meddling in Iranian affairs. 
US Villainisation of Iran and Failure to Acknowledge Past Injustices against Iran 
This issue is more symbolic and rhetorical than substantive. While the anti-US 
rhetoric emerging from Iran has been colorful, Iran has nonetheless felt aggrieved 
by what it sees as a global propaganda campaign by the US to isolate and vilify 
Iran. As earlier discussed, there is a lot of historical baggage in the relationship 
which Iran feels the US has largely ignored. Iranian pride demands that the US 
acknowledge and preferably apologise for past wrongs against Iran. 
Domestic Political Impediments 
As [ have already stated, domestic political factors, particularly on the Iranian 
side, are probably the major impediment to rapprochement and eventual 
norn1alisation. The historical legacy of grievances and mistrust and the Israel 
factor have made the issue of normalisation politically charged for both sides. In 
both countries, foreign policy is the product of a range of domestic political 
pressures and special interests, reducing the scope for flexibility on either side. 
US Environment 
In the US, the policy debate on Iran has intensified since Khatami came to power 
in Tehran. While most agree that an official dialogue with the Islamic Republic 
would be a useful step, the key question for policy-makers is how much 'carrot' 
and how much 'stick' to use with Iran in getting it to amend policies of concern 
to the US and/or agree to come to the table to talk. 
A powerful Israel lobby and othcr hard-liners work assiduously to ensure that 
maximum stick is maintained with Iran, while it pursues policies of concern to the 
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United States. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AI PAC) is the 
most important lobby organisation in Washington for Israeli interests. It works 
closely with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an affiliated think 
tank. AIPAC has close links with Capitol Hill and provides a stream of 
legislation to the Congress designed to contain Iran and benefit Israel. For 
instance, AIPAC was behind the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The 
responsiveness of legislators to the AlP AC agenda is connected to AIP AC's 
ability to raise campaign finance and influence voter sentiment. The pro-Israel 
Jewish community is well organised and traditionally generous in supporting 
political causes and candidates. Few US legislators can afford to ignore the clout 
of the Israel lobby. The Republican-controlled Congress is therefore unlikely to 
cooperate with the US administration in a major loosening of tough US policies in 
the absence of a perceptible change in Iranian behaviour. 
AIPAC and the Israel lobby also wield considerable clout with the Clinton 
administration itself, based on campaign contributions and the placement of 
strongly pro-lsrael officials throughout key positions in White House, State 
Department and National Security Council. Indeed the Israel lobby has the major 
influence in setting the administration's Iran policy, and it is no coincidence that 
the three declared areas of particular US concern mirror the concerns of Tel Aviv. 
Moreover, Iran's sworn opposition to the existence of the state of Israel will 
continue to antagonise the Israel lobby in Washington, encouraging it to maintain 
a hard line on Iran, until Iran capitulates completely to US positions. 
There is also a strong contingent of analysts and policy advisers in the State 
Department and the Pentagon who remember the US Embassy hostage crisis and 
the deaths of US servicemen at the hands of Irani an-backed groups in Lebanon 
and other places. This group similarly is in no hurry to extend Iran an olive 
branch. 
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The position of the hard-line group on Iran in Washington can be largely 
encapsulated in the arguments put forward in a 1998 monograph produced by the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in which it is stated that current US 
policies of maintaining tough sanctions are efficacious and that "sanctions should 
only be eased or lifted in return for major concessions by Iran - not as a goodwill 
or confidence-building measure"42 
More moderate voices, including a range of academics, Iranian emigres and some 
business interests, argue that prolonged economic pressures on Iran only harm 
US strategic and economic interests, and strengthen the hand of the hard-line 
groups in Tehran. In short, they believe that a prosperous, secure Iran will be 
less dangerous than a poor, paranoid Iran. However, the moderates lack clout. 
For instance, "USA Engage", a business group lobbying for a lifting of sanctions 
and the opportunity to do business with Iran, has had little success so far in 
attracting the vocal support of members of Congress, mainly because many are 
skittish about being seen to be closely associated with a pro-engagement line43 . 
Iran Environment 
[n Iran the picture is even more complex and the political environment more 
uncertain, as the unrest of July 1999 demonstrates. The existence of multi-
centres of power greatly restricts the Iranian administration 's room for 
manoeuvre and Khatami's capacity for unilateral action on rapprochement with 
the United States. There are few issues which generate as much controversy as 
the question of relations with the United States. This stems partly from the deep 
historical legacy of distrust and unresolved grievances, as well as the revolution's 
cry for independence from an imperialist and corrupt America. No Iranian 
42 Patrick Clawson and Michael Ei scnstat. "Opportunities an d Challenges for U.S. Policy" in 
lrall Under Kilatami, ed. Patrick Clawson, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
Washington, 1998) 99-113: quote on p.I02 
43 Conversations with 'USA Engage' members and an associated lobbyist in the last three 
months. 
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politician can ignore this without risking his or her political life. The concerns of 
the regime are not only of political and economic hegemony but also 
American/Western cultural influence that could erode popular support for the 
Islamic system. 
The traditional right or conservative faction, which is associated with the leader, 
is particularly concerned about nornlalisation with the US spelling the demise of 
their hold over the people and the major levers of power. Specifically, they fear 
that ties would lead to accelerated Western cultural encroachment and 
secularisation . This group has the key influence over policy on the United 
States, principally because it is the leader who would have the ultimate say on 
such an important and strategic matter. In addition, the Islamic Republic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), allied closely with this political current, 
principally controls Iran's links to rejectionist groups and the Lebanese Hizbullah 
and Iran's WMD and missile development programs. The IRGC is under the 
patronage and command of the leader and therefore tends to ignore the more 
moderate voices in the Khatami administration who would like to see Iran make 
some gesture to appease declared US concerns . 
Another major factor in the conservatives' opposition to rapprochement is the 
threat to lucrative business operations and monopolies held by members of this 
group. They are fearful that, if ties were restored under Khatami, members of the 
reformist administration would be better placed to form strategic alliances with 
US companies and to push the conservatives out of business. 
Conservative opposition to nornlalisation is at the same time part of a naked 
power struggle for the future of the regime. The faction opposing ties is aware of 
the growing popular mood for normali sation and recognises that relations with 
the US would bring an economic boon to the country, lift the morale of the 
people and solidify Khatami ' s grip on power. Already threatened by Khatami's 
widespread popular support, they do not wish to hand him the major victory of 
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being the one to have presided over a restoration of ties with the US. They are 
afraid that this would make him politically invincible. Therefore, they will 
continue to obstruct him until they are in a position to take control of the 
administration, at which time they will probably act quickly to restore relations, 
thus gaining the credit. This would also help ensure their grip on emerging 
economic opportunities with the Americans. According to the recent comments 
of a fomler adviser to conservative presidential candidate, Nateq-Noori, had 
Nateq-Noori become president, he would have moved immediately towards a 
restoration of ties. 
There is no question that the reformist faction , associated with Kbatami, is more 
in tune with the popular will which is strongly supportive of early normalisation 
with the US. The Khatami camp firmly believes that early normalisation can be 
highly beneficial to Iran's economic, security and national interests generally, and 
that Iran cannot afford to continue to reject US overtures, whatever the potential 
risks of engagement may be for the current system. However, such is the 
political sensitivity of the issue that, even with a partial breaking of the taboo on 
public debate over the issue, Khatami cannot yet explicitly express a desire for 
normalisation at this time. This hesitancy also reflects a genuine wariness of US 
designs. The administration needs more concessions from the United States 
before it can feel confident enough to weather conservative opposition and agree 
to a dialogue. In any case, such agreement would need the imprimatur of the 
leader, a difficult obstacle given the leader's constituency. 
Conclusion 
The barriers to normalisation remai n fomlidable, particularly the domestic 
political barriers on the Irani an side. Nevertheless, throughout the Khatami 
presidency, both sides have been closely attuned to the various signals and 
gestures from the other side. Indeed, despite the constraints on Kbatami, he has 
precipitated increasingly open discussion in Iran over the possi bility of re-
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establishing relations with the United States. In the next chapter I will track 
developments during the Khatami period and how these have impacted on 
prospects for rapprochement and normalisation. 
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Chapter Five 
Developments in US-Iran Relations under Khatami 
Introduction 
As noted previously, Khatami's recognition of the importance of engaging the 
West and his declared commitment to pursuit of a policy of detente raised 
popular expectations both in and outside Iran that as president he would bring 
about the necessary changes to end Iran ' s isolation and re-establish relations 
with the United States. But substantive progress towards rapprochement with 
the US has remained elusive, despite renewed interest and efforts on both sides 
for a thaw in relations since Khatami's election. In tracking developments in US-
Iran relations throughout the Khatami period, we will see that it has often been a 
case of 'one step forward, one step, or even two steps, back'. A key reason for 
this is that neither side has been able to breach the wall of mistrust. Each believes 
the other has not sufficiently heeded or addressed the speci fic issues and 
grievances identified by the other. Also, as discussed, domestic political factors 
have also played a central role in blocking progress, particularly on the Iranian 
side. While Khatami has managed to precipitate some lifting of the taboo on 
public debate about the possibility of normalisation, the continuing political 
muscle of his hard line opponents has had a stifling effect on how far the 
administration can go with the issue. 
There is little doubt Khatami has genuine reservations about relations with the 
United States. He, like most other members of th e regime, remains deeply 
suspicious of US designs on Iran. The dilemma for Khatami is that normali sation 
with the US is in Iran ' s national interest, economically, politically and 
diplomatically, and is probably necessary to guarantee Iran's economic security. 
(Although Iran has consistently down played the significance and impact of US 
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sanctions, it is clear that they have greatly undermined Iran's economy and 
ability to attract investment and financing.) Such pragmatic national interest 
concerns are what has prompted Khatami to take whatever steps he can to foster 
an environment conducive to rapprochement and eventual normalisation. 
Through a more gradualist approach, Khatami hopes to avoid a confrontation 
with his political rivals and exposure to accusations that he is selling out on the 
fundamental values of the revolution. 
Initial Feelers 
After his August 1997 inauguration, the first clear indication of Khatami's 
interest in engaging the United States was at a news conference in December 
1997. Khatami declared his desire to re-establish a dialogue with the American 
people in the near future, hinting that it was unfortunate the two countries had 
not done more to patch up their differences. Gently chiding the US Government, 
he said he hoped "the American politicians would understand their time better, 
understand the realities and move forward"44 Such openly conciliatory 
comments targeted at the United States by a senior revolutionary Iranian leader 
were unprecedented. It was clear that Khatami's felt strengthened enough to 
come out with such comments by the strong popular mandate he had received in 
the May 1997 election. 
What makes Khatami's comments particularly courageous is that only a few days 
prior to the news conference, Khamenei, who has the final say on such issues, 
had given a fiery speech at the opening of the OlC Summit in Tehran in which he 
warned against "Western cultural domination" predicting that " the moral 
wasteland of Western civilisation will eventually sink in its own rubble". This 
was widely interpreted as a rebuff to Khatami's well-known views on inter-
civilisational dialogue, and in particular, dialogue with the United States, and was 
44 "Iran Extends Hand to Americans", International Herald Tribun e, 15 December, 1997 
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in marked contrast to the tone of Khatami's address to the same Summit on this 
theme. Khatami's more targeted comments on dialogue with the US at the 
December press conference reflected a determination to forge ahead with his 
vision, despite the views of the leader. 
CNN Interview and Aftermath 
Undeterred by the leader's reservations, Khatami persisted with his detente 
offensive, giving an interview to CNN on 7 January 1998. He described the 
interview as an opportunity to address the American people directly and to 
convey to them Iran's/Khatami's perspectives on the historical relationship 
between Iran and the United States. It was in this interview that he expanded on 
his comments of the previous month, proposing a "dialogue of civilisations" 
between America and Iran. Khatami said the dialogue could be conducted 
between "professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists and tourists" . 
His interview was a clear attempt to mend some of the historical hurts and 
address some traditional US Govemment concerns. For instance, he expressed 
regret for the damage done to the feelings of Americans by Iran's seizure of the 
US Embassy hostages, again an unprecedented gesture by a senior Iranian regime 
figure. He acknowledged that the killing of innocent civilians in the streets of 
Israel was terrorism, condemning such acts, but drawing a distinction between 
terrorists and freedom fighters. 
Terrorism should be condemned in all its fonns and manifestations; assassins 
must be condemned. TelTorism is useless anyway and we condemn it 
categorically. Those who level these charges against us are best advised to 
provide accurate and objective evidence, which indeed does not exist. . 
.. At the same time, supporting peoples who fight for th e liberation of their 
land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism. It is, in fact, supporting 
those who are engaged in combating state telTorism.45 
45 "Khatami Interview", CNN, Tehran, 7 January, 1998 
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He rejected the notion that Iran was working to derail the Middle East peace 
process, outlining Iran's stance in the following terms. 
We have declared our opposition to the Middle East peace process because we 
believe it will not succeed. At the same time, we have clearly said that we do 
not intend to impose our views on others or to stand in their way. In our view 
all Palestinians have the right to express their views about their land, including 
the millions of Palestinians in Diaspora. They too have a right of self-
determination. Only then can there be a lasting peace. We seek a peace 
through which Jews, Muslims and Christians, and indeed each and every 
Palestinian, could freely determine their own destiny. And we are prepared to 
contribute towards the realisation of that peace . 
.. The subject of Middle East peace is one that needs a sober and pragmatic 
analysis. We believe that it will not succeed, because it is not just and it does 
not address the rights of all parties in an equitable manner. We are prepared to 
contribute to an international effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East46 
On proliferation issues, Khatami denied Iranian WMD ambitions saying that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, which had inspected Iranian nuclear 
facilities several times, had given Iran a clean bill of health regarding the existence 
of nuclear weapons development programs47 
But Khatami still felt constrained in calling openly for political relations with the 
United States. He skirted the issue by declaring that Iran had "no need for 
political ties with the United States". However, he did hint at the possibility of 
an eventual restoration of relations, saying that there fust needed to be "a crack in 
this wall of mistrust". He also said that the dialogue between the peoples of the 
two nations could forge a better future for both countries. 
Khatami 's interview generated a lot of excitement in Iran. An opinion poll taken 
shortly after the interview showed that 82 per cent of people thought Khatami's 
remarks about the establishment of ties with America were good or very good48 
The moderate press came out strongly supportive of Khatami 's comments while 
46 Khatailli CNN Interview 
47 Ibid 
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the conservative press were more sceptical. The hard-line conservative daily 
"Kayhan" reminded its readers of Khomeini's statement that the United States 
wanted its relationship with Iran to be like that between "the wolf and the 
sheep". Other conservative mouthpieces took issue with the President's 
seemingly apologetic tone in relation to the taking of the US Embassy, which the 
conservatives refer to as the "second revolution". Conservatives also rejected the 
notion that Khatami's comments were meant to be a signal to the US on relations, 
saying that decisions on such matters rested with the leader, not the president. 
Shortly after the President's CNN interview, the leader, in a Friday prayers 
address, appeared to pour cold water on the debate by firmly rejecting the notion 
that Iran was looking to reappraise its relations with the United States. While 
careful to avoid criticism of the president, Khamenei did refer to his own 
differences of "taste and tone" with Khatami. He accused the United States of 
wanting to create disunity within Iranian society over the issue of relations with 
the US and to force Iran to the negotiating table so that it could impose its will. 
They want to break the taboo (on discussion of relations with America) in the 
same way they broke the taboo regarding Arabs and Israel. There was a day 
when Arab Governments considered talking to Israel, relations with Israel and 
even mentioning the name of Israel as one of the most ugly acts. By bringing 
up this issue, putting someone forward, removing someone from the ranks of 
the Arab people, they did something that gradually broke the taboo. 49 
Khamenei went on to say that "establishing relations and a dialogue with America 
had no benefits for the Iranian nation"; that negotiations with America or 
relations with America would not prevent American enmity"; and finally, that 
"dialogue and relations with America would be altogether harmful to the Iranian 
nation and the international Islamic movement". Khamenei remarks were a signal 
to the people and his own constituency that he was not actively prepared to 
48 "President's Message to American People: Sign oflran's Strength" Kar va Kargar, Tehran, 17 
FebnJary, 1998 
49 "Khamcnei Friday Prayer Address" , Vaice afthe Is/amie Republic of Irall, 16 January, 1998 
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entertain the idea of nonnalisation. According to members of the regime'°, he felt 
privately miffed at Khatami's readiness to generate public debate on this issue. 
Khatami's December 1997 remarks and his subsequent CNN interview generated 
a lot of attention in Washington. The Americans had been following with interest 
the change in tone coming out of Tehran after the Khatami election. Frustrated 
by a lack of progress with Iraq, despite eight years of sanctions, the Americans 
felt highly motivated to try to encourage and nurture the new moderate tone 
emerging from Tehran. The US State Department made the following statement 
about the interview 
We welcome the continuation of a new tone in Iranian statements. President 
Khatami ' s extensive comments with respect to US civilisation and values were 
interesting. We appreciated the spirit in which those remarks were offered. We 
also noted the president's comments that the conduct of relations between 
nations must be based on mutual respect and dignity. We agree. 
We also heard what he had to say about Islam. We respect Islam as one of the 
world 's great monotheistic religions, and have excellent relations with many 
Islamic countries. We also noted with interest his rcgret conceming the 
hostage taking. We welcome his statement that this period in Iranian history 
is over, and that the rule of law should be respected, both domestically and 
intemationally. On terrorism, President Khatami 's rcjection and condemnation 
of all forms of terrorism directed at innocents was noteworthy .. 
.. With regard to the relationship and the dialogue, we listened very 
carefully to his remarks. We agree that over almost 20 years, the mistrust and 
distance between us is great, and it will take a lot of effort to overcome this 
difference. We will look closely and take a serious look at what President 
Khatami has said regarding people-to-people exchanges and the people-to-
people dialogue. However, we believe the best way to address our bilateral 
differences would be to engage in a government-to-govemment dialogue. We 
should sit down and air differences. We would raise our concerns. The 
Iranians could raise their concems. 
So let me stress that changes in Iranian policies on support for terror, the 
development of weapons of mass destruction and support for violent opposition 
to the Middle East peace process remain key to forging a better relationship. 
With regard to President Khatami's statements on Iran's grievances, we take 
Iran's concerns seriously. We would listen to what they have to say. We 
would hope Iran would take our concems seriously as well.SI 
50 Conversation with contacts in Tehran close to the leader's office 
51 "US State Department Press Briefing", Washington, 8 January, 1998 
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This was probably the most explicit invitation issued to date by the Americans 
for a political dialogue to discuss issues of concern to both sides. It demonstrated 
US interest in capitalising on Khatami's more conciliatory tone and encouraging 
detente. 
Equally significant was the following comment by US President Clinton later in 
January 1998 on the occasion ofId al-Fitr. 
To the people of Iran, I would like to say that the United States regrets the 
estrangement of our two nations. Iran is an important country with a rich and 
ancient cultural heritage of which Iranians are justifiably proud. We have real 
differences with some Iranian policies, but I believe these are not 
insurmountable. I hope that we have more exchanges between our peoples and 
that the day will soon come when we can enjoy once again good relations with 
Iran52 
Clinton sent a further message on the occasion of the Persian New Year III 
March, hailing the close and historic links between the two peoples. 
The Thaw Continues 
Khatami's interview and the positive US response provided impetus for non-
official exchanges between the two countries. For instance, in February 1998, 
Tehran hosted the US wrestling team. A return visit by the Iranian team took 
place in April 1998, despite the protestations of some Iranian conservatives. 
However, the visit was not without hiccups, with the Iranians protesting to the 
US over the poor treatment of the team by US Immigration officials. This 
prompted the State Department to step in, announcing a revision of procedures 
for the treatment ofIranians entering the US. 
Such contacts were widely interpreted among the Iranian population as cracks in 
the ice and the begitmingof a rapprochement. At this stage the conservatives, 
52 "President's Remarks on the Occasion ofId al-Fitr", White HOllse Press Office, Washington, 
29 January, 1998 
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who were sceptical of the Khatami agenda, were relatively quiet, preferring to 
accept the delimitation enunciated by Khatami between dialogue of governments 
and people-to-people exchanges. 
In parallel with the development of non-official exchanges of this kind, the US 
Government continued to adopt a more positive and encouraging tone with Iran, 
while maintaining its fundamental policy stance. In early February 1998, a senior 
US official reported that Albright, in her recent discussions with Yasser Arafat, 
had commented that Tehran seemed to have tempered its hostility to the Middle 
East peace process, which was "very encouraging". Khatami had reportedly told 
Arafat during the Ole Summit in Tehran in December 1997 that "whatever the 
Palestinians can agree to (with Israel) we can live with". Later that month, 
Albright made positive comments about Iran's efforts in combating illicit drug 
trafficking, despite Iran not being included in the official US list of countries seen 
as cooperating to stop international drug trafficking. 53 The list had been issued a 
few days prior to Albright 's comments . US intelligence officials were also 
encouraged by what they assessed to be a curb in Iranian support for 
international terrorist groups. However, such assessments were not enough to 
have Iran removed from the State Department's 1997 list of state sponsors of 
terrorism announced in April 1998. Iran's removal would have been seen as 
premature by hard-liners in Washington, particularly in view of Iran 's well-
documented, continuing support for Lebanese Hizbullah and rejectioni st 
Palestinian groups. 
However, the US administration continued to send positive signals to Iran in less 
controversial areas. For instance, in early 1998 the State Department changed the 
wording of its travel advice for Iran to a simple recommendation that Americans 
defer travel to Iran, rather than warni ng them against travelling. The change was 
described by State Department officials as significant, inasmuch as it now 
53 "Alblight on Iran's drugs war", [rail Focus, London, March 1998 
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recognised that only some segments, not all, of the Iranian government and 
population remained hostile to the US. The US also eased travel restrictions in 
the US on members ofIran 's UN permanent mission in New York. 
The issue of a restoration of ties also generated renewed interest in taking a fresh 
look at Iran among some on Capitol Hill. For instance, leading Democratic 
Congressman, Lee Hamilton delivered a speech in April 1998 calling for renewed 
dialogue and more overtures from the US administration. Some US legislators, 
such as Congressman Bob Ney 54 and Senator Arlen Specter declared their 
readiness to visit Iran and build up ties with Iran's Majles. 
The Iranian Government, for its part, continued to pursue a foreign policy of 
detente, partly with a view to pressuring the US to rethink its policy towards 
Iran. In March, Iran was delighted with comments by visiting Italian foreign 
minister, Lamberto Dini, the first EU minister to visit Iran in more than a year, 
that Iran 's alleged support for international terrorism is a thing of the past and 
that he no longer thought that Iran represented an obstacle to the Middle East 
peace process. Iran also hosted UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary 
Robinson around the same period for a UN-sponsored Human Rights Workshop. 
Kharrazi's comments that human rights were "universal, independent of 
conditions, and transcend all boundaries" and his call for the "promotion of 
tolerance,moderationandgenuinedialogue"55 were welcomed by Robinson. The 
hosting of such an event and such comments were aimed at countering US and 
Western concerns over Iran's human rights record. 
Iran appeared to be watching every nuance of the US very carefully. Press 
commentary and debate on the issue in Iran gradually became bolder. Despite his 
dismissive comments in January, even the leader appeared to indicate his 
54 Ney told representatives of the business lobby group, "USA Engage" in early July 1999 that 
he had lined up ten Congressmen to visit Iran as soon as the State Department gave the go ahead. 
55 Kamal Kharrazi , "Address to UN-sponsored Human Rights Workshop" Tehran, 28 February, 
1998 
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openness to the possibility of an eventual restoration of ties, albeit based on 
certain conditions. In a speech in early April 1998, he declared that "as long as 
America is sticking to its current ways, it will be considered our enemy and Iran 
will not reach out towards it". The very conditionality of this statement was 
interpreted favourably by the advocates of rapprochement on both sides. 
Around the same time, the reformist Islamic Guidance Minister and government 
spokesman, Ataollah Mohajerani made a surprising admission, when he said that 
"the Iranian Government had not yet decided on whether to have direct talks 
with the US", implying that this matter was under current consideration by the 
administration 56 
The US made its first major gesture to Iran in May 1998 when the 
administration, in the face of considerable opposition from the US Congress, 
waived sanctions on Total, Petronas, and Gazprom for their $2 billion investment 
in Iran's energy sector. The terms of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
(ILSA) had specifically provided for the imposition of sanctions on any foreign 
company that invested in that sector. The waiver was ostensibly granted in 
return for greater cooperation from the EU and Russia on halting military 
technology transfers and combating terrorism 57 But US officials privately 
conceded that an important element in the decision had been a desire to send a 
conciliatory signal to Tehran. Most industry observers agreed that it was now 
unlikely the administration would impose sanctions in future on foreign oil 
companies. Albright even announced that future cases involving EU companies 
would result in like decisions. However, Albright did declare later that the US 
remained strongly opposed to oil and gas pipelines that transit Iran, and that the 
administration "will carefully examine any proposal for trans-Iranian pipeline 
56 "More Steps towards Rapprochement" frail Focus, London, April 1998 
57 Kemp, America and frail Road Maps ([lid Realism 69 
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construction across Iran for possible implications under ILSA and take whatever 
action is appropriate"58. 
Iranian responses were disappointing. The domestic political environment had 
started to sour for Khatami which clearly hampered him from capitalising on the 
issue. The US decision coincided with a stepped-up campaign by the 
conservatives to target key reformists, such as the mayor of Tehran, Karbaschi, 
who was arrested by the conservative controlled judiciary. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that Khatami and other senior regime figures did not consider the US action 
significant enough to merit a positive reciprocal gesture. Iran used the US waiver 
decision simply to highlight the futility of US policies, calling on the US to lift 
remaining sanctions. 
Albright's 'Road Map' Speech 
Albright ' s speech to the Asia Society in June 1998 was the clearest US signal to 
date of its desire to mend fences and achieve normalisation with Iran. Outlining 
US policy towards Iran, Albright extended Iran an olive branch, declaring US 
readiness to "explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid 
misunderstandings". Specifically, Albright proposed that the two sides work 
together to develop a "road map leading to normal relations".59 The use of the 
term "road map", the same as that used in America' s rapprochement with 
Vietnam, was significant in signaling that the US alone did not have the 
prescription for normalisation and needed to work together with Iran. A few days 
later, on the occasion of the World Cup soccer match between Iran and the US, 
President Clinton underlined the importance of the issue to the US, expressing his 
hope for "ending the estrangement between our nations"60 
58 Madeleine Albright, "Address to Asia Society" New York . 17 June. 1998 
59 fbid 
60 Kemp, AnJerica and fran: Road Maps and Realism 12 
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Initial Iranian reaction to the US overtures was muted, largely on account of the 
Khatami administration's continuing preoccupation with domestic factional 
struggles61 Nevertheless, Khatami commented at the time, "we have noticed a 
change in the tone, but we are always looking for sincerity in practice and not just 
in words". We have recently seen signs of a better understanding by the 
American politicians of the realities of the position of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran". The message was clearly intended to signal to the US that while American 
gestures were appreciated, Washington needed to go further, if it wished to see 
Iran reciprocate. The Iranian Press was divided in its reaction to the Albright 
speech. Hard-line newspapers dismissed it as nothing new, while the more 
moderate press described Albright's comments as significant. 
In what was partly a sign of US interest in avoiding an unnecessary undermining 
ofa gradually improving atmosphere with Iran, President Clinton in July vetoed 
legislation (Iran Missile Sanctions Act) that would have imposed tough sanctions 
on Russian firms that sell missile technology to Iran. The US also promised to 
crack down on the activities of the MKO, which it had placed on its list of 
terrorist organisations in October 1997. 
'One Step Forward, One Step Back' 
However, the following few months were to see significant setbacks for a thaw in 
relations and a subsequent loss of momentum towards detente. This can be 
largely attributed to intensified factional struggles in Iran, which increasingly 
constrained Khatami from taking further steps in relation to the United States. 
For instance, Iran's testing of a medium-range ballistic missile in July, a week 
ahead of the release of the US Congress's Rumsfeld Commission Report into 
Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States (and its allies), could not have been 
61 Khatami was caught up in dealing with the impeachment of his Interior minister, Abdollah 
Noon and the arrest and trial ofthe reformist mayor of Tehran, Gholam-Hossein Karbasehi, both 
targeted by the conservative faction. 
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better timed to strengthen the hand of the anti-Iran hard-liners in Washington. 
The decision to test at that time would have been taken by senior IRGC 
commanders with the imprimatur of their commander-in-chief,Khamenei. While 
Khatami would have been consulted, given his role at Chairman of the Supreme 
National Security Council, he would not have been in a position to argue against 
the tests going ahead at that time. 
Clinton presented a balanced US response describing the test as an "obstacle" to 
efforts to warm relations with Iran but not an "argument for closing off all 
avenues of opportunity". He indicated the US was "very concerned about the 
test, but not surprised by it"62 This reflected a tacit recognition of the US 
administration of Iran's legitimate security concerns63 It could also be 
interpreted as an implicit signal that the US administration was aware that such 
programs are largely in the hands of the hard-liners, who would welcome the 
opportunity to upset prospects for rapprochement. However, Clinton's 
sympathetic viewpoint was not shared by a Republican-dominated Congress, 
which used the Rumsfeld Report to pressure the administration to maintain a 
tough line with Iran. 
Another issue which caused concern in Washington in the same month was the 
execution of an Iranian Bahai, the first since 1992. This was clearly part of a 
conservative offensive to derail Khatami's efforts to improve relations with the 
west and in particular, to obstruct move towards a rapprochement with the US. 
July was not all bad news. A former hostage taker and current editor of the 
leftist daily Salam, Abbas Abdi, who is close to Khatami, had a historic meeting 
with former US Embassy hostage Barry Rosen in Paris on 31 July. The meeting 
was viewed as a symbolic move to heal the legacy of bad blood between the two 
countries. 
62 Remarks by US President Bill Clinton, White House, Washington 23 July, 1998 
63 Analysts in the CIA and State Department privately acknowledge that Iran does have 
legitimate security concerns that would push it to acquire a strategic defence capability. 
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In August 1998, several Iranian diplomats and journalists disappeared when 
Taleban forces took Mazar-i-Sharif in western Afghanistan. The US 
administration graciously issued a statement condemning any Taleban detention 
of Iranian officials and calling for their immediate release under international law. 
(Iran had earlier issued an official statement condemning the terrorist bombings of 
US missions in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that same month, and renewing its call 
for international cooperation to combat terrorism64 .) Later, when it was 
discovered that the captured Iranians had been killed by the Taleban, Iran gained 
kudos for the restraint it showed, despite considerable sabre-rattling. 
Afghanistan has since emerged as an issue where the US and Iran can cooperate as 
co-members of a "six plus two" group on Afghanistan, which meets under the 
auspices of the United Nations. US officials see such cooperation in the 
international arena as a useful confidence-building measure, as it brings into direct 
contact senior officials of the two governments. Despite some suspicions that 
the CIA are assisting the Taleban, Iran welcomes the chance to be involved in an 
international effort to resolve an issue which affects its interests so directly. It 
also sees participation in the "six-plus-two group" as an opportunity to reinforce 
its credentials as a responsible regional player 
Khatami and Kharrazi Visit New York 
The visit of Khatami to the UN General Assembly in New York, accompanied 
by his forei gn minister, in September 1998 rai sed expectations on the US side 
that the Iranians would use the opportunity to respond officially to Albright 's 
Jun e "road map" speech. Kbatami 's speech to the UNGA was typically 
visionary and statesmanlike. For instance, he ca ll ed for 2001 to be declared by 
the UN as the "year of dialogue among civili sat ions", a proposal subsequently 
64 "Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement", Tehran, 8 August, 1998 
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adopted by UNGA. At the same time he boldly took the initiative in addressing 
issues of particular interest to the US, putting the onus back on the Americans. 
For instance, on proliferation, Khatami called for the establishment of nuclear free 
zones ahead of a complete abolition of nuclear weapons. 
Recent nuclear tests in the region, which have led to further complications, 
make such a necessity all the more imperative. We should realise that the idea 
of attaining security through the acquisition of such armaments is nothing but 
an illusion .. 
The establishment of zones free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly 
in the Middle East, constitutes an appropriate first step in alleviating tension 
and mistrust emanating from these weapons. We, in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, as the victims of the use of weapons of mass destruction, are cognisant, 
more than anybody else, of their horrifying impact. We shall thus stay in the 
forefront of international efforts to establish and strengthen universal 
arrangcments fortheir destruction65 
Similarly, on terrorism, Khatami sought to take the high moral ground, by 
publicly calling for greater international cooperation to combat the phenomenon. 
Honest and sincere efforts to combat the menace (of terrorism) in all its forms 
and manifestations, including state terrorism, constitute anotber important 
priority for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Terrorism is a product of desperation and nihilism. In a world swirling in the 
orbit of violence and oppression, serious combat against terrorism will not 
advance beyond the realm of words and slogans. Eradication of terrorism must 
be concurrent with a global search for justice. Thi s assertion should in no way 
be interpreted as ajustification for any form of terrorism. 
We unequivocally oppose, as required by our religious, moral and cultural 
values and norms, all forms and manifestations of terrorism and we shall 
combat it vigorously and earnestly. In our view, in order to eradicate thi s 
menace, we should engage in a serious and transparent international cooperation 
to combat terrorism, and at the same time redouble our efforts to attain the 
objective of global justice.66 
Elsewhere in his address, Khatami called for the establishment of a "security and 
cooperation system" in the Gulf, an oblique appeal for the inclusion of Iran in 
Gulf security arrangements. Khatami also discussed the conflict in Afghanistan 
at length, declaring that there was no military solution to Afghanistan'S 
65 Khatami , "Addrcss to the UN General Assembly" New York, 21 September, 1998 
66 Ibid 
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predicament. In his address to the UNGA on the same day as Khatami, Clinton, 
in similar vein to Khatami, made reference to the importance of dialogue and 
cooperation between Islam and the West. Significantly, he also made specific 
reference to Iran as a country "where innocent people have been victimised by 
terror"67 
An address by foreign minister Kharrazi to the Asia Society on 28 September 
1998 served as Iran's official response to the Albright speech given at the same 
venue several months earlier. The event was well-attended by a range of senior 
US Government officials, all expectant, according to one attendee, that Iran would 
signal its interest in moving the process of rapprochement forward. 
However, the speech was disappointing for the AmericanS'8. While 
acknowledging the new tone emerging from Washington which he said indicated a 
departure from the past and possibly a desire to revisit past US policies, 
Kharrazi firmly rebuffed the Albright invitation for an official dialogue, at least 
until the US changed its policies towards Iran. 
Logically, the United States' active pursuit of the policies I have already 
outlined and the absence of visible signs of its intention or ability to change 
course are hardly compatible with the proposal to develop a road map to change 
the state of affairs. This is because there is no ground for political negotiations, 
while these policies continue. In line with underlying principles of our foreign 
policy, the approach of the Islamic Republic ofIran towards the United States 
will be commensurate with changes in US behaviour towards Iran69 
Kharrazi did not hold back in detailing Iran's grievances towards the United 
States. Specifically, he leveled criticism at US economic sanctions and pressures 
placed on Iran, US sabotage ofIran's role in regional security and US interference 
in Iran's internal affairs. On the last point, he not only referred to the allocation 
by the US Congress of a budget to undermine the government of Iran, but also the 
recent establishment of a US-sponsored Radio Free Europe Farsi service. Indeed, 
67 "Clinton Address to the UN General Assembly" New York, 21 September, 1998 
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the US Government decision to fund this service, which generated a lot of 
criticism in Iran around that time, may have been an important factor in 
constraining Kharrazi from adopting a more conciliatory tone. 
Kharrazi also outlined Iran ' s stance on terrorism, WMD and support for the 
Middle East peace process in familiar terms. The Iranians clearly saw the 
occasion as a key opportunity to respond to specific US concerns. On terrorism, 
he echoed Khatami in declaring that Iran condemned terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations regardless of its victims or perpetrators. He referred to a recently 
signed joint statement issued by Iran and Russia on terrorism, declaring Iran's 
"readiness to participate in any international instruments that might emerge in the 
battle against global terrorism"70 He also expressed Iran 's willingness to 
cooperate in the global fight against narcotics, interpreted as a clear signal to the 
Americans ofIran's interest in cooperation on non-controversial issues of mutual 
interest. On WMD, Kharrazi declared that the threat can only be removed by 
eradicating them, saying that Iran had already participated actively in moves to 
eradicate chemical and biological weapons and would be prepared to do so on 
nuclear weapons. On the Middle East peace process, Kharrazi defended Iran 's 
stance deploring one-sided US support for Israel and accusing the US of 
misconstruing genuine resistance to occupation as terrorism. 
Deteriorating Environment for Detente 
The disappointment of the Kharrazi address for the Americans was compounded 
by Iran 's strong condemnation of the US-brokered Wye River accord between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority shortly afterwards. Khatami branded the 
accord as a violation of Arab rights. He was quoted as saying that "thi s accord 
will not bring the region nearer to peace. It is detrimental to the Palestinian 
69 Kamal KhalTazi, "Address to Asia Society" , New York, 28 Septem ber, 1998 
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people"7l. Khamenei was similarly strident describing Arafat as a " lackey" of 
Israel at Friday prayers in Tehran on 30 October 1998. Although such 
statements by senior Iranian leaders only provide ammunition to the Israel lobby 
in Washington, in reality, such statements are targeted more to a domestic 
constituency. However, the credibility of Iran's claims that it is not supporting 
violent opposition to the peace process was not helped by subsequent 
Palestinian Authority accusations that Iran was backing the violent activities of 
Hamas. 
There have been signs since Khatami came to office that Iran wants to appear 
more flexible on the peace process. In addition to Khatami's comments to Arafat 
at the OIC Summit in Tehran in December 1997, Kharrazi, during a visit to 
Lebanon just prior to his New York visit, said that if Israel withdrew from 
southern Lebanon, "the goals of the resistance will have been achieved'?2 . 
Although he was subsequently taken to task by Hizbullah over his right to make 
such a statement, it is clear from such comments that Iran would probably look 
to cease military assistance to Hizbullah if Israel were to withdraw. In April 
1999, Khatami privately told visiting PLO political bureau chief, Farouk 
Kaddoumi, that Iran would accept whatever form of Palestinian state the 
Palestinians decided on, implying that Iran might be able to tacitly accept the 
existence of the entity of Israe]73. Flexibility on this issue of recognition would 
go a long way to overcoming a real hurdle to rapprochement with the United 
States. 
The regime' s annual commemoration of the taking of the US Embassy on 4 
November 1979 took on an interesting twist in 1998, reflecting the new sentiment 
for rapprochement. Instead of burning an American flag, the pro-Khatami 
student gathering burnt an effigy representing "world arrogance", a synonym for a 
7l "Middle East Peace" lran Focus, London , November 1998 
72 Kemp, America and fran: Road Maps and Realism 61 
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hegemonic United States. The justification was that, in tune with Khatami 's 
policies, the students would not violate the flag, being a symbol of the American 
people. The rally was uncharacteristically conciliatory calling for a dismantling 
of the wall of mistrust between the two countries and inviting the former 
hostages to return to Iran as guests. Such declarations infuriated the hard-liners 
who did their best to disrupt proceedings. The event highlighted the factional 
divide and polarisation on this issue with which the Khatami administration has 
had to contend. An extremist group even threatened to launch suicide attacks 
against American interests, should the Americans return. On 5 November, 
Khamenei again weighed into the debate on the conservative side, declaring that 
"even though the US officials' tone appears to have changed, the truth is they 
will not be satisfied with anything less than domination of Iran's resources and a 
return to the situation before the Islamic Revolution"74. 
The commencement of broadcasts into lran by Radio Free Europe (RFE) Farsi 
service around that time caused more protests from the Iranians further 
constricting Khatami's latitude for action on the US issue. Foreign ministry 
spokesman, Mahmoud Mohammadi , said that "this radio has been set up in the 
framework of America's $20 million fund against Iran and is considered 
interference in the Islamic Republic of [ran's internal affairs and is contrary to 
international rules". Foreign Minister Kharrazi threatened to make a formal 
complaint to "international bodies including the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague",75 The US State Department said that it could not understand why a 
"little free radio" was causing so many problems for the Iranian Government. 
Information and public discussion of ideas had increased in Iran in recent years, 
so it was "surprising" that [ran was "responding so negatively" to US radio 
broadcasts76 The reason this issue is particularly sensitive for Iran is on account 
of the penetration capacity of radio broadcasts. While the Persian press IS given 
74 Television News Report , [RfB, Tehran, 5 November, 1998 
75 "Kharrazi interview with Abrar" Agel1ce France Press. Tehran. 8 November, 1998 
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considerable latitude, radio and TV news and commentary is much more strictly 
controlled, given its greater potential impact on a wider proportion of the 
population 77 
Second track diplomatic activity between the two countries had also slowed 
down as it became subject to stepped-up criticism by the conservative faction in 
Iran, and potentially more hazardous for the participants. For instance, the visit 
of a quasi-official American business and academic group to Iran in November 
brought home the potential pitfalls of second-track diplomacy in a volatile 
political environment. The Iranian Foreign Ministry had initially denied there 
was a US delegation in town, later revising its position to say that the group in 
question was simply a tourist group. Hard-liners claimed the group was a de 
facto official delegation sent to Iran at the behest of the US Government. This 
was partially true. The head of the delegation had met Albright prior to the visit 
and had promised to brief her on his return. The fact that the group secretly met 
various officials in the foreign ministry and elsewhere in the Iranian Government 
triggered protests, including a street march in Qom and an attack on the bus 
carrying the group. News of the visit had been leaked by the conservatives. 
These developments prompted a flurry of criticism from the conservative press 
over second-track contacts with the Americans. The Iranian foreign ministry felt 
compelled to go on the defensive issuing the following statement 
The Foreign Ministry, in accordance with the view expressed by the eminent 
leader, considers any kind of direct or indirect diplomatic negotiations with the 
United States of America's administration to be contrary to the principles of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign pOlicy.78 
77 A recent conversation with the director of this service revealed that it is extremely popular 
with audiences in Iran and that many Iranians telephone in to provide comment and information. 
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As a result the Khatami administration became even more cautious in such 
second-track dealings with the US as did the Americans, although less 
controversial people-to-people contacts have continued. 
By late 1998, the debate in Iran on US-Iran relations had been superceded by 
domestic political pre-occupations, as the Khatami administration felt it had gone 
as far as it could without significant political risk. The US for its part, while 
disappointed that Iran had not taken up the idea of an official dialogue, had come 
to recognise the difficult domestic political environment in Iran and the need for 
patience. 
The continuing persecution of Bahais by the Iranian authorities and the murders 
of several writers and political dissidents in Iran late in the year again raised 
concerns in Washington. However, in the case of the murders, the Iranian 
Government's willingness to arrest rogue elements in the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security was welcomed by the US as a "positive step towards maintaining 
the rule ofJaw in Iran, and providing for the security of Iranians to express their 
beliefs''79 Even before the arrests, the US had condemned the killings in terms of 
"forces in Iran that are clearly attempting to stifle free expression and undermine 
the rule of law''8o. The references to "rule of law" were clearly intended as a 
signal of support for Khatami's efforts. 
The Iraq Factor 
Another issue which has continued to impact on the environment for US-Iran 
rapprochement is Iraq. Saddam's continuing recalcitrance has been a compelling 
factor in America's interest in taking a fresh look at Iran. Clinton's 
announcement late in 1998 that the US was stepping up assistance to Iraqi 
opposition groups to undermine Saddam, presented a tentative opportunity for 
79 "US State Department Press Briefing", Washington, 6 January, 1999 
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cooperation with Iran in the view of the United States. Although State 
Department spokesman, James Rubin claimed that the US was not working with 
the Iranians nor soliciting Iran's support for the policy, he made it clear that the 
US was "not going to complain" if Iran did indeed lend its support. These 
comments evoked a swift reaction from the Iranians, with a senior official 
declaring that Iran would not work with the US to oust Saddam. 
Iran's reaction was understandable inasmuch as it could not be seen to be 
condoning interference in the internal affairs of another state. In addition, as 
discussed, Iran has remained very suspicious of US intentions and what kind of 
government might replace Saddam, as well as the risk of partition. On balance, 
Tehran is happy with the status quo which works to Iran's geostrategic, political 
and economic advantage. 
However, as already mentioned, a major aspect of concern for Iran in relation to 
the Iraq issue remains the US military presence in the Gulf. Having said that, the 
Iranian response to US missile strikes against Iraq in December 1998 was 
decidedly low key. Kharrazi commented on the issue to a TV reporter in the 
following terms. 
The missile attack against Iraq will only cause more calamity for the people of 
Iraq and will increase tension in the region. Of course, at the same time, the 
Iraqis are obliged to continue their cooperation with the United Nations 81 
Again, when a stray missile, intended for Iraq, hit the southern Iranian city of 
Khorramshahr, it is noteworthy that Iran largely refrained from its norn1ally 
strident anti-US rhetoric, preferring to deal with the matter in a cool-headed way. 
The foreign ministry announced that the US had offered an apology through the 
Swiss Embassy, which handles US interests in Iran. The foreign ministry 
understandably adopted a much tougher tone after a second stray missile hit the 
Iranian city of Ahwaz in late January 1999. KhatTazi declared that the United 
81 "Kharrazi TV Interview" iRiB, Tehran, 17 December, 1998 
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States must apologise to compensate for violation of Iran's airspace. 
Conservative Majles Speaker, Nateq-Noori criticised the foreign ministry for 
having taken such a soft line after the first missile hit. He said "the Americans 
should know that they retain responsibility for such rash acts and that Iran's 
patience has limits"82 The Majles, which had planned to drop the symbolic anti-
US fund from the annual budget, promptly voted to restore it after the second 
missile hit. Above is a clear example of the climate of deep mistrust which so 
easily derails progress towards rapprochement between Iran and the US. 
Continuing Overtures 
Despite the lack of progress through 1998, the Americans have persisted in 
trying to convince the Iranians to come to the table without preconditions. 
Former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who still maintains influence in the 
US-Iran debate, summed up fundamental US motives when he declared in a 
speech in January 1999 that Iran is simply "too large and too strategic" to be 
isolated within its region and beyond. He appealed for a resumption of 
diplomatic ties ahead of a resolution of differences. Significantly, he also called 
directly on Clinton and Khamenei to "embark on the rapid re-establishment of 
diplomatic relations".83 These remarks were significant inasmuch as they sent a 
clear message to Iran that the US appreciated Khamenei's crucial role in any 
normalisation process. Albright picked up on at least some aspects of Vance's 
words later in January when she responded to a question about Iran and how the 
US could encourage moderate forces. 
It is important that a country of that size, importance and location not be 
endlessly isolated. And we have lookcd, with great interest, at the election of 
President Khatami. And have tried to understand better what the election 
meant, how he reflects the will of the Irani an people. And have analysed, 
basically, that those who electcd him came from a broad section of th e Jranian 
population , but specifically included a lot of younger people and women. And 
we felt (that) bodes well in terms of the future. 
82 "Iran-US Relations" [ran Focus , London, February 1999 
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But if you look at what has been happening, he clearly is going through a 
number of difficult political times, and there are a variety of internal factions and 
factors going on. We are watching for opportunities84 
In Iran the internal debate has continued, although no one in the Kbatami 
administration has been prepared or able to shift from the fundamental stance 
that Iran would not consider rapprochement unless the US changed its policies. 
The domestic political situation has been too volatile. However, some key 
figures on the fringes of the system have been prepared to speak out, fanning the 
debate. 
For instance in February 1999, dissident senior cleric Ayatollah Montazeri, who, 
despite a large popular following and links to the Kbatami camp, is currently 
under house arrest over criticism of Kbamenei, called for studies of 
rapprochement with the US. The call was issued in the form of a bold open letter 
to theology lecturers in Qom. Montazeri stated that "the two countries' 
estrangement did not need to be permanent. This issue should be studied by 
foreign policy experts .... away from factional considerations, and one should act 
resolutely if they conclude that it is in the interest of the country to re-establish 
relations". Notably, he gave an interpretation of the late Ayatollah Kbomeini's 
stance on the matter, who is often cited by the conservatives opposed to 
rapprochement. "The late Imam called America the "Great Satan" and generally 
rejected all ties with it, but it is obvious that such a ruling is temporary and could 
change according to economic and political conditions."85 
To date, but no one as prominent had come out so openly placing such emphasis 
on exigencies and national interest considerations, although there had been intense 
behind-the-scenes debates and some press commentaries along these lines. Those 
84 Madeleine Albright, "Comments at Center for National Policy", Washington, 21 January, 
1999 
85 Ayatollah Montazeri, "Open Letter on US-Iran Relations" Khordad, Tehran , 6 February, 1999 
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who had dared refer to the economic benefits and necessity of normalisation had 
been quickly shouted down by the hard-liners. 
Influential Majles deputy, Javad Larijani, who in recent years has been more 
associated with the moderately conservative camp, picked up the theme in a 
press article in March, where he called openly for a restoration of ties with the 
US to be considered, if indeed it were in the national interest to do so. "Should 
Iran-US relations serve our national interests, then officials should naturally take 
measures to establish ties. Establishing relations, severing them or downgrading 
them are all subject to an essential criterion which is our country ' s interests. " 86 
While he was careful not to directly advocate a restoration, by highlighting that 
Israel and its Washington lobby would oppose Iran-US ties, Larijani obliquely 
hinted that he believed that normalisation would be in Iran's interest, as there is a 
consensus in the regime that Israel opposes anything that is good for Iran. 
Positive signals continued to come out of Washington within the constraints of 
existing US policy. In March, the State Department welcomed the holding of 
local council elections in Iran describing them as a positive development and as 
representing "a further step towards increased popular participation in the 
Government"87 . 
On 12 April 1999 Clinton commented to a gathering at the White House that 
"Iran, because of its enormous geopolitical importance over time, has been the 
subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations". While Clinton's 
conciliatory comments apparently took his own advisers by surprise, they 
generated a cautiously favourable response in Tehran, although the predictable 
refrain was 'actions are what's needed, not simply words'. However, Khatami 
later described Clinton ' s remarks as courageous, commenting that "Clinton 
referred to an important and basic issue, which, if handled and settled, many 
86 "Javad Larijani on Iran-US Ties" Sobh-e £l11rooz, Tehran, 8 March, 1999 
87 "US State Department Press Briefing", Washin gton, 1 March, 1999 
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issues will subsequently be solved"88 Khatami was referring to US hegemonic 
policies and Clinton's remarks were viewed in Tehran as going some way 
towards acknowledging that reality, a key Iranian grievance. He was signaling 
Iran's desire to see a US policy shift as a mark of US good faith. 
On 28 April the administration announced that sanctions on the sale of food and 
medicine to all countries currently under US sanctions, including Iran, would be 
lifted. This followed the passing of a non-binding resolution by the US Senate 
the previous month, urging the Clinton administration to approve the sale of grain 
to Iran. The issue had first arisen in August 1998 when the Iranian Government 
Trading Corporation, responsible for all of Iran's grain imports, had placed an 
order for $500 million in grain with a US company. With grain prices depressed 
and US farmers struggling, certain members of Congress and the Senate had taken 
up the cause for exempting food from US sanctions, backed by the powerful US 
agricultural lobby. The decision has paved the way for grain sales to Iran, with 
the finalisation of the regulations governing such sales were released in late July 
1999. The administration has been at pains to point out that the decision is 
governed by a desire not to use food and medicine sanctions as a tool of foreign 
policy, and is not meant as a gesture to Iran or any other country. 
Iran's initial reaction to the move was low-key. The Iranians realised that this 
decision was primarily taken to benefit US farmers. Clearly it was not enough to 
give Khatami sufficient political currency to take a step towards the US. Foreign 
minister Kharrazi commented 
We see greater realism from the US administration towards Iran lately ...... The 
lifting of US food and medicine sanctions is good news for American producers 
since it serves their purposes. This is a unilateral move. We accept the lifting 
of sanctions when the US ban on the export oflranian products to the US is 
lifted89 
88 "Khatami Interview" Qatar af-}azirah Space Channel TV. Doha, 23 May, 1999 
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Iran appears to be holding firm. Despite an increased need for wheat imports this 
year, a senior Iranian official declared after the release of the US regulations that 
Iran had no intention of sourcing any grain imports from the United States while 
US economic sanctions remain in place90 . Iran clearly is determined to show that 
it does not need to do business with the United States, although pragmatic and 
price considerations may eventually dictate otherwise. In the meantime, Iran 
hopes that withholding its business will generate pressure on the US 
administration to lift sanctions on Iranian imports into the United States. 
Shortly after the food and medicine sanctions were lifted in April, the US 
administration declined Mobil ' s long-standing request for an oil swap 
arrangement with Iran. This can be interpreted as a clear indication of the US 
administration's determination not to provide Iran any major unilateral 
concessions, particularly in the hard currency generating energy sector, without 
some concrete gesture from Tehran. Shortly before the Mobil decision, the US 
State Department had protested another major oil deal signed between European 
companies and the Iranian Government declaring 
It's our understanding that the deal has been signed. We are both disappointed 
and concerned about this development. The US remains strongly opposed to 
investment in Iran's petroleum sector. We have repeatedly urged the 
governments of France and Italy at the most senior levels to discourage thi s 
investment. 
As in all such cases, we will look closely at the facts of what has happened and 
we will be assessing the implications under ILSA (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act). 
If sanctionable activity is found to have occurred, we will decide upon and take 
appropriate action. We stand by Secretary Albright's statement at the US-EU 
summit last May concerning an expectation (ofa waiver) with respect to EU 
firms. However, we have made clear to our European partners that an 
expectation is not a guarantee91 
Although the statement was little more than US bluster and a waiver is a foregone 
conclusion, ILSA reduces the administration 's room for manoeuvre. The 
Congress would not oblige in repealing the legislation, and may even seek to 
90 Iranian Deputy Minister for Conunerce, Masood Karbasian, quoted in Tehran/ran News, 26 
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renew it when it expires in August 2001. According to Republican Congressman, 
Bob Ney, it is unclear what the policy of a new Republican administration 
towards Iran would be and whether the Congress would be inclined to extend 
ILSA92. 
Fresh Obstacles 
The atmosphere for a breakthrough between the two countries has been made 
more difficult in the last few months by several issues. One of these is terrorism, 
with the retention ofIran - albeit no longer identified as the leading sponsor - on 
the US list of state sponsors of terrorism in its 1998 report, released in April this 
year. The report had this to say about Iran. 
Iran continues to plan and conduct terrorist attacks, including the assassination of dissidents 
abroad. It supports a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals - including several 
that oppose the Middle East peace process - by providing varying degrees of money, training safe 
haven and weapons93 
A potentially complicating issue for US-Iran rapprochement is the report's 
mention of "the March 1998 awarding by a US district court of $247 million in 
damages against Iran to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen killed in an 
Islamic Jihad attack in Gaza in April 1995. The court ruled that Iran was 
responsible for her death because it provided funding to Islamic Jihad"94 Indeed, 
during Khatami's September 1998 visit to New York, Flatow's lawyers tried to 
seize his plane, but were prevented from doing so by the US Government. The 
US administration has also prevented the family from laying legal claim to 
disputed Iranian assets in the US, with a presidential waiver issued in October 
1998. In response to the report, the Iranian Foreign Ministry rejected the 
91 "US State Department Press Briefing", Washington, 2 March, 1999 
92 Private conversation in Washington, July 1999 
93 "US State Department Report on Pattems of Global Terrorism: 1998", Washington, April 
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allegations in familiar terms saying, "it is regrettable that the US Government 
which is itself one of the main supporters of terrorist groups and state terrorism, 
levels such baseless accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran". He urged 
the United States to "correct its double standards policy".95 
Iran has long been emphatic in pointing out that it too has been a victim of 
terrorism, specifically of MKO attacks, the most recent case being the 
assassination of General Ali Sayyad Shirazi in Tehran in April 1999. It has 
accused the US of providing financial and political support for this group and 
allowing it to operate on US territory, despite it being placed on the US 
Government list of terrorist organisations in October 1997. While the MKO's 
subsequent initial legal appeal against the decision has been unsuccessful , it is still 
able to operate under other umbrellas, and continue to conduct a strong anti-Iran 
lobbying effort. In July 1999 it held an anti-Iran rally in Washington, attended 
by nine members of Congress, some of whom addressed the crowd. 
US concerns about Iran's WMD programs arose again in April with the testing 
by Iran of a medium range surface-to-air missile, which could serve as a WMD 
means of delivery. The issue is a particularly worrisome one for the US, which 
has periodically accused Russia and China, North Korea and Pakistan of 
providing technological assistance to Iran in this area. While US Government 
officials privately concede that Iranian WMD ambitions are understandable given 
the regional security environment, they remain finn in vocally opposing any 
Iranian activity in this sphere. Martin Indyk, the US Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern Affairs, gave a speech shortly after the missile test, declaring that 
"Iran's detennined development of ballistic missiles to enable delivery of its 
weapons of mass destruction over long distances has the potential to trigger a 
new and dangerous anns racc across the region." Indyk said the US would focus 
95 "Iran Slams US Terrorism Accusations" Reuters. Tehran, I May, 1999 
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its efforts on preventing Iran from acquiring and developing WMD and ballistic 
missiles.96 
In April the US Senate introduced the "Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
Act" targeting in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency program of 
technical assistance to Iran. The bill would cut off US funding to the IAEA 
unless the IAEA terminated its assistance to Iran. The bill is likely to be vetoed 
by the administration even if it passes through the Senate. (A parallel bill was 
passed overwhelmingly by the House in July 1999.) 
Iran remains defiant on this issue. For instance, the Iranian foreign ministry 
described comments Indyk made during a visit to the Gulf in June 1999 that Iran 
was pursuing WMD as "unfounded"97 Around the same time, Khatami made a 
speech rejecting allegations that Iran was a security threat saying that its defence 
budget was low compared with those in the region. 
US concerns over Iran's violent opposition to the Middle East peace process 
were raised again in May after Khatami met with representatives of various 
rejectionist groups in Damascus during his visit in May 1999. Indyk commented 
that the meeting showed that "Iran continues to oppose negotiations between 
Arabs and Israel''l8. However, the meeting can be interpreted as important for 
Khatami in demonstrating that in the absence of[sraeli compromise, Iran was not 
prepared to demur from its support. In addition, the strong traditional 
identification within the Iranian leadership with the Palestinian cause probably 
contributed to his decision. Press reporting of what transpired in the meeting 
was bland, claiming that Khatami simply offered the groups Iran's continuing 
support. This was the version picked up by the US, over which it expressed 
96 Martin Indyk, "Address to the Council on Foreign Relations", New York, 22 April, 1999 
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disappointment in Khatami. However, there is speculation99 that Khatami was 
far more qualified in his comments to the rejectionist groups. Nonetheless, the 
meeting has provided additional ammunition to the Israel lobby in Washington to 
continue pressure on the administration to maintain a hard line with Iran. 
Human Rights in Iran has also re-emerged as a significant impediment to a thaw in 
relations in recent months. Iran was bitterly disappointed with the passing of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution on Iran in Geneva in April. The 
US was a co-sponsor. Iran had been so confident that the resolution would be 
voted down that it had brought in a film crew to record the occasion. In the same 
month, the White House issued a statement protesting the sentencing of four 
Bahais for teaching the religion. The statement read as follows: 
Imprisoning people for the practice of their religious faith is contrary to the 
most fundamental international human rights principles. 
We condemn the Iranian Government's persecution of the followers of the 
Bahai faith, and we urge President Khatami to ensure the immediate release of 
all Bahais who have been imprisoned for the observance and expression of their 
religion. We will continue to monitor the treatment of all minority religions 
in Iran. 100 
The Bahai issue was eclipsed in June with the revelation that members of the 
Iranian Jewish minority had been arrested in February and March on charges of 
spying for Israel and the US. Both Israel and the US promptly denied that the 
detainees had any intelligence role. Albright described the arrests as 
"unacceptable". This only fueled Iranian hard-liners who insisted that this denial 
only reinforced the case against the Jews. Hard-line Iranian Judiciary chief 
Ayatollah Yazdi incited the crowd at Friday prayers in Tehran on 11 June into 
calling for the execution of the detainees. 
This created an even greater uproar in the West and in Israel , prompting Khatami 
to issue a statement on 12 June pointing to the freedom of all religious minorities 
99 Private comment ofIran analyst with good connections to Khatami administration 
8S 
in Iran and claiming responsibility for the protection of "every single member of 
every religious persuasion who lives in Iran and who has accepted the system of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran"lol. Iran ' s UN Permanent Mission also issued a 
statement denying that the arrest of the Jews had anything to do with their 
religion or internal politics. It highlighted the fact that there were Muslims among 
the arrested group and that all would receive a fair trial. 102 
Despite the Iranian Permanent Mission's denials, the arrests are indeed part of an 
internal domestic political struggle. The hard-liners who control much of the 
judicial and security apparatus have used this arrest partly to derail movement 
towards a thaw in relations with the United States as well as improving relations 
with the West. It is in the interests of the hard-liners to generate a climate of fear 
and insecurity, which will bolster their own authority. Khatami is constrained by 
his own rhetoric insofar as he has been a strong advocate of the rule of law. He 
does not want to be seen to be riding roughshod over the judicial process, even 
though there are serious doubts about the legitimacy of its methods. 
The impact on US-Iran rapprochement is already being felt. According to the 
Washington Post, a quiet undertaking by the World Bank to restore Iran's 
qualifications for assistance has been stymied by the arrest l03 Opposition to 
such assistance has been led over the last few years by the US which has major 
influence over the World Bank. This was an area where the US administration 
was showing signs of flexibility until this incident. 
Indyk, in a hearing before the House International Relations Committee on 9 
June, expressed his concern over the gap between words and deeds on human 
rights. In reference to the arrests , he said 
100 "US Condemns Iran Sentenc ing" Associated Press, Washington, 2 1 April , 1999 
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we find it hard to reconcile President Khatami's words with the announcement 
yesterday that 13 members of the Jewish communities of Shiraz and Isfahan, 
including rabbis, would be charged with espionage. These arrests send a very 
disturbing signal. We call on the government ofIran to ensure no harn1 comes 
to these individuals and to release them104 
July 1999 Student Unrest 
The most recent event to impact significantly on prospects for rapprochement is 
the unrest in Iran which took place in July. Pro-reform, pro-Khatami students 
took to the streets to protest the closure of a reformist newspaper and the 
passing of a revised press law that would restrict freedom of expression. The 
hard-line conservatives and vigilantes struck back attacking the students, which 
triggered several days of demonstrations and rioting. The events shook the 
regime which quickly organised a pro-regime rally after brutally suppressing the 
unrest. They blamed foreign hands - ie. the US and Israel - as being behind the 
unrest. 
In reality, the trouble was sparked by conservative hard-line groups in a 
deliberate attempt to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity and halt political 
reform and rapprochement with the United States l05 Conservative tactics of 
accusing the reformists of endangering the revolution and blaming the US for 
conspiring to bring down the system underscore how difficult it is for Khatami 
and the reformists to move too quickly outside the established parameters of the 
system in a turbulent domestic political atmosphere. 
The US Government reaction to events was deliberately low-key, so as to avoid 
giving ammunition to the hard-liners. At a State Department press briefing in 
mid-July, spokesman James Foley said 
10J "Loans to [ran Stall After Arrest of Jews" , Washington Post, 23 June, 1999 
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We have followed with concern the reports of violence being used to put down 
widespread demonstrations by Iranian students in support of freedom of 
expression and democratic values and the rule of law. The rule of law cannot 
be achieved through repression of fundamental freedoms , including freedom of 
expression, association and assembly. We oppose the disruption of peaceful 
assembly through the use of violence and deeply regret the resultant injuries 
and loss of life. We call on the Government of Iran to protect peaceful 
demonstrators and to respect international human rights standards 106 
Anticipating that US sympathy might damage the students and pro-reform 
forces, Foley added that the US would stand up for the same rights in any 
country. A few days later, President Clinton expressed concern that US 
comments on the unrest could be misconstrued by hard-liners in Iran. 
Frankly I'm reluctant to say anything for fear that it will be used in a way that's 
not helpful to the forces of openness and reform. I think that people 
everywhere, particularly younger people, hope that they will be able to pursue 
their religious convictions and their personal dreams in an atmosphere of greater 
freedom that still allows them to be deeply loyal to their nation. And I think 
the Iranian people obviously love their country and are proud of its history and 
have enormous potential. And I just hope they find a way to work through all 
this, and I believe they will.I 07 
Clinton's reference to freedom to pursue religious convictions is a clear signal that 
the United States respects the Islamic character of the regime and has no intention 
of plotting to replace it with a secular government. However, the careful 
comments of the administration were not enough to avoid being blamed for the 
unrest. In fact, even if the United States had remained silent, this would not have 
deterred the conservatives from accusing the US of plotting against the regime. 
The security authorities have since systematically moved to arrest and interrogate 
a large number of the reformist students. According to a Ministry of Information 
(Intelligence) statement, some of these students have allegedly been acting under 
the influence and guidance of "counter-revolutionaries" abroad108 One student 
leader. Manochehr Mohammadi, who has been singled out, recently spent 
several months in the United States as part of a second-track diplomatic 
106 "US State Department Press Briefing", Washington, 12 July, 1999 
107 "Joint White House Press Conference with Israeli Prime Minister Barak", Washington, 21 
July, 1999 
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initiative. This has been used against him and he has been forced to participate In 
a televised confession, reminiscent of the early years of the revolution. 
Through such manipulation of events, the hard-l ine conservatives have succeeded 
in intimidating the reformist camp and in largely tying Khatami's hands. Most 
observers in Washington agree that in the current climate it will be difficult to see 
much progress towards rapprochement as any further gesture from the United 
States at this time could backfire. Conversely, Khatami and the pro-reform camp 
are unlikely to pursue any bold initiatives in an atmosphere of insecurity and 
fear. In short, the 'one step forward, one step back' , in this case, possibly 'two 
steps back' , scenario continues. 
108 "News Report" IRIS Television First Program Network, Tehran, 18 July, 1999 
89 
III 
Conclusion 
As clear from the previous chapter, Iran and the United States each remain 
acutely attuned to the signals and gestures of the other, despite a frustrating lack 
of progress. Neither side has been able to lower the 'wall of mistrust' sufficiently 
to achieve any breakthroughs and barriers to restored relations remain formidable . 
The current state of play between the two governments can be described as a 
standoff. In the absence of a substantial Iranian gesture, the US administration 
assesses it has gone as far as it can with its offer of an official dialogue with no 
preconditions. Although Khatami's philosophy and foreign policy indicate that 
he is clearly interested in seeking detente, mounting domestic political pressures 
give him even less latitude to make a significant gesture to the United States or 
accept the offer of dialogue, until Washington addresses key Iranian grievances. 
Entrenched conservative interests opposed to any rapprochement under Khatami 
would use every means at their disposal to derail any such moves by the Iranian 
president. 
But Khatami has managed to precipitate a partial lifting of the taboo on public 
discussion of the possibility of restoration of relations. Such discussion has 
increasingly centered around what is ultimately in the national interest. 
Khatami's lack of room to manoeuvre on this issue means that he will continue to 
portray America as the demandeur in the process and hope that the US, when 
the time is ripe, will make a unilateral gesture sufficient to allow Khatami enough 
political capital to achieve the leader's endorsement for entering a formal dialogue. 
At the same time, Iran is aware of the domestic political constraints on the US 
administration. This has driven Khatami, Kharrazi and others to periodically 
explain Iranian thinking about US concerns. But Kl1atami' s capacity to curtail 
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the activities of concern to the US will remain limited, as long as his conservative 
adversaries retain such extensive power in the system, and remain determined to 
sabotage Khatami's policy of detente. 
Normalisation is in the Two Countries' Respective National Interests 
While the two countries could hypothetically remain perpetually estranged, 
respective national interest considerations will continue to prompt both sides to 
seek, however tentatively, a rapprochement. In the paper so far, I have dealt 
broadly with the philosophical underpinnings informing Khatami's policy of 
detente and dialogue, and in illuminating US policies, I have demonstrated 
America's overriding interest in the promotion of security and stability in an 
important region. However, I think it is useful to outline the range of interests on 
both sides, propelling moves towards a thaw in relations, despite the obstacles 
and setbacks. 
US interests 
Successive US Governments have recognised the vital strategic importance of the 
Gulf region for the United States. Not only does it contain two thirds of the 
world's proven energy reserves, but it is also the nexus where three continents 
come together. Because of these factors, major powers have and will continue to 
compete for influence in the region. Even in the post-Cold War era, when the US 
has become the dominant global power, it cannot assume dominance over this 
region without active involvement in the region. Within the region Iran occupies a 
key position as the largest and most populous state, and one of its leading oil 
producers. 
Another reason why the US must stay focused on the region is the proliferation 
threat. Not only Iran, but some of its neighbours, notably Iraq have or are 
developing nuclear, chemical and/or biological capabilities with the attendant risk 
9 1 
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of an eventual regional and even global conflagration. Close US ties to Israel 
intensify the imperative it feels to contain any such threat. Policy makers are 
faced with a dilemma. They know that the current US policy of containment of 
Iran and Iraq is not proving successful, particularly in the case of Iran, and they 
are looking for a 'formula' or 'road map' to achieve a breakthrough with Iran. 
The US can either tighten the screws on Iran, including through geo-strategic 
encirclement, in the hope that the current regime will collapse or that it will 
eventually capitulate to US demands. Alternatively, Washington can seek 
detente and engagement with the current regime in Iran, by offering incentives and 
scaling back punitive sanctions. This latter course, though there are many 
variables when it comes to devising specific strategies, may in the longer term 
serve US regional strategic aims more effectively. On the other hand, as the pro-
Israel hard-liners argue, the latter approach might only end up strengthening an 
Iran that remains doggedly defiant of US policies. Economically, US policy 
makers agree that engagementwill yield a range of commercial opportunities for 
US companies in what is a large and potentially lucrative market. This alone is an 
increasingly compelling argument for the US to adopt a strategy of engagement. 
As discussed, US policy is currently caught somewhere in between - that of 
dangling some 'carrot' but mainly making use of 'stick'. In other words, it is 
unwilling to abandon punitive policies, but at the same time is keen for dialogue. 
iran 's interests 
As we have seen, Iran has defiantly declared that it has no need for relations with 
the United States. But this is little more than revolutionary bravado in the face of 
continuing punitive US polici es towards Iran. Khatami and most in the regime 
realise that, whatever the ri sks of engagement with the US to Iranian 
independence, the current estrangement is highly damagingto Iran ' s interests on 
many fronts. As we have seen, KJlatami is firmly committed to the notion that 
[ran cannot afford to ignore indefinitely the reality of US global political and 
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economic clout. It knows that in an economically interdependent world, the US 
can continue to damage and erode Iran's economic fortunes, or conversely, it can 
provide great assistance. A failing economy means an increasingly restive 
population with consequences for the very survival of the Islamic regime. This is 
an increasingly real and worrisome possibility for the regime leadership. 
Fears offalling again under US hegemonic influence - political, strategic, economic 
or cultural - are not totally unfounded, but this is something most countries have 
to contend with to a greater or lesser extent in their dealings with the United 
States. Kbatami knows that building a strong and prosperous Iran is the key to 
the regime's-survival, and that continuing US containment policies towards Iran 
could derail the experiment of Islamic government. His domestic reforms and 
foreign policy of detente are aimed at ensuring the survival of the Islamic 
Republic, even though he realises that the reforms will mean that some in the 
system have to forfeit their positions of unchecked privilege. This is a 
fundamental difficulty Kbatami faces. In short, many entrenched interests in the 
regime remain fearful of the ultimate ramifications of engagementwith the United 
States. Therefore, they are sceptical of Khatami's view that the risks of 
continuing estrangement outweigh those of engagement. 
Prospects for Normalisation 
Starting from the premise that Iran and the United States will inevitably 
nom1alise relations, based on respective national interests outlined above, I will 
conclude by providing an analysis of the short, medium and long term prospects 
for normalisation, outlining various scenarios. 
Short Term Prospects 
I define "short term" as "one year". As we have seen, there has been little 
substantive progress to date towards rapprochement, despite moves on both 
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sides over the past two years. Looking ahead a year, one must be very 
pessimistic about the prospects for any breakthrough to dialogue and eventual 
normalisation. Currently, the levels of distrust and suspicion on both sides 
remain too high. The road will continue to be rocky and unpredictable. Various 
issues, the detained Iranian Jews and, most recently, the student unrest will 
continue to sour the atmosphere further in the months ahead. Politically, on both 
sides of the fence, the conditions are not ripe for a decisive move to dialogue and 
normalisation. Forces on both sides opposed to rapprochement will continue to 
seek to inflame the atmosphere. 
On the US side, the Israel lobby remains strongly opposed to Iran and will 
fiercely resist any US responsiveness to Iranian demands for unilateral US action 
to change punitive policies. With a Republican-dominated Congress, it would be 
fanciful to think that Congress would agree to dismantle sanctions legislation 
against Iran going into a US presidential election year. Moreover, Iran has just 
been retained on the terrorist list, there is an uproar in the US over leakage of 
sensitive military technology to China, and new legislation targeting Iran's nuclear 
programs has just been tabled in the US Senate. In such an environment, it is 
difficult to see a decisive unilateral move from the US of the kind that would 
allow the Khatami administration to agree to come to the table. The only light on 
the immediate horizon is the prospect of some movement in the Middle East 
peace process, that could lead to an early Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, with a 
concomitant ending of Iranian military support to the Lebanese Hizbullah. 
However, progress in this area alone would not be sufficient to prompt a decisive 
unilateral gesture by the United States to Iran. 
The Khatami administration is probably even more constrained in taking the step 
to official dialogue with the US , far less normalisation within this period. For the 
last two years Khatami has been LInder intense political pressure from hard-line 
opponents. The recent unrest is symptomatic of the unstable atmosphere and 
pressures on Khatami and the refolmist camp are expected to intensify in the lead 
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up to the Majles elections in Febmary 2000. The main reason is that the Majles 
elections will be pivotal in the factional power struggle and there is a chance that 
the Khatami camp may manage to take control of the Majles. The stakes are 
very high. Khatami's control of the Majles would help him consolidate his 
control over more of the key centres of power, through a reformist legislative 
program. But even if the Khatami camp succeeds in winning the Majles, 
consolidation of power will take time, as Khatami eschews the "crash or crash 
through" approach. 
Conscious of the potential for internal upheaval and open conflict, Khatami has 
so far opted to move ahead cautiously with the implementation of his policies. 
The recent unrest will make him even more cautious. His main pre-occupation 
remains the economy as well as domestic political and judicial reform and greater 
accountability in the system. Despite widespread popular support, Khatami 
currently lacks the political currency to attempt a bold unilateral step to dialogue 
with the US, even ifhe assesses such a move is in Iran's economic interests. If he 
were to do so, in the current climate he would make himself extremely vulnerable 
to attack from hard-liners that he has betrayed the principles of the revolution 
and has capitulated to American pressure. At this stage, Khatami needs to 
portray the United States as the one desperately seeking rapprochement. In 
short, in the absence of significant shifts in US policies, Khatami is unwilling and 
probably unable to respond to the US invitation for a political dialogue within 
this time frame . 
Medium T?rm Prospects 
I define medium term as one to three years. The prospects for commencement of 
dialogue in this period are very good, while those for full normalisation are 
probably only fair. The main factor affecting prospects will be domestic political 
developments in Iran. Iran is very well aware of US concerns, but the existence 
of several power centres in the regime makes it difficult for the Khatami 
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administration to control the behaviour of those in the revolutionary organs, 
principally the Revolutionary Guard Corps, who are most closely involved with 
radical groups abroad, missile and WMD development, activities in southern 
Lebanon and hits on the MKO and other opposition groups. The next three 
years will probably see Khatami consolidate his hold over the key centres of 
power, including the Majles, with a continuing evolution towards a civil society, 
rule of law and greater accountability in the system. The process is largely 
unstoppable - though there will be setbacks and convulsions along the way - and 
attempts to tum back the clock to a more autocratic structure risk major internal 
upheaval. While, there are those who have accused the conservatives of plotting 
to remove Khatami, such a move is unlikely while Khatami remains so popular. 
Conservative attempts to discredit him have so far backfired, simply reinforcing a 
perception that he is being sabotaged and is therefore not responsible for the 
continuing hardships of ordinary Iranians. Even those who grumbled about his 
unwillingness to point the finger at the hard-liners during the recent unrest 109, are 
still generally sympathetic. A Khatami victory for a second term commencing in 
200 I is highly probable, given this enduring popularity and the lack of a viable 
alternative. We can therefore expect a continuing pursuit of the Khatami vision, 
which includes detente with the United States, based on Iran's national interests. 
Once he has achieved political refornl, Khatami will be better placed to take more 
decisive action to address economic reform. Iran cannot afford to dally with 
economic reform. The Government is well aware of the dire need for alleviating 
economic hardship, which will worsen further if meaningful microeconomic 
reform and worsening macroeconomic indicators are not addressed. For instance, 
in the next two years, the number of new jobs required is expected to rise to 
109 While condcmn ing the attack by hard-liners on studcnts along with the Icader and oth er 
senior regime fi gures, Khatami fell into line with the o ffic ial posi ti on that thc subsequent rioting 
was thc work of people backed by forcign hands. He d id not pub licly condcmn the hard-line 
agent s who continued to stir up troublc. It is clear that Khatami fc lt compellcd to avoid undue 
provocation of hi s conservative opponents, with its attcndant ri sk o f triggering even greater chaos. 
Like others in the regime, his overrid ing concem is preservation of the system and maintenance of 
at Icast a fa~adc of unity among the Icadership. 
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700,000 to 800,000 per year, reflecting Iran's young population (65 per cent are 
under 25). Iran, which currently has a negative GDP growth rate of between 
minus two and minus three per cent, will need to achieve a growth rate of six per 
cent to achieve the required job creation level. Iran's unemployment rate already 
stands at close to 20 per cent. While loathe to admit it, the Government knows 
that rapprochement with the US would prove a timely and much-needed boost to 
Iran's economy. Entering into a dialogue with a view to normalisation would 
restore investor and consumer confidence in the economy and Iran would 
eventually gain better access to international finance on more favourable terms. 
It is clear that a decision to enter a dialogue with the US could easily be justified 
on national interest grounds. Khatami, backed by popular expectations and wider 
control over the various levers of power in the system, will be in a stronger 
position to convince the leader, Khamenei and other senior figures in the regime 
that the time is ripe for dialogue. The leader is increasingly aware of the 
importance of remaining sufficiently mindful of public opinion, and this point 
would be reinforced further if there are more incidents of popular protest. To 
continue to ignore popular wishes would make the leader vulnerable to removal, 
although Khatami is unlikely to move to oust him. 
While the above scenario of a re-elected and more powerful Khatami is probably 
the most plausible, there is always a considerable element of unpredictability in 
Iranian politics. Hard-line conservatives, who feel they are being gradually 
marginalisedand losing "their revolution", may opt to take extreme measures to 
maintain power. As we have seen, there has already becn a concerted campaign 
to undermine Khatami. It is not inconceivable that Khatami could be the target of 
an assassination ancllor that the hard-liners could encourage further rioting, 
violence and upheaval which would require the imposition of tough security 
measures. Such measures would play into the hands of the hard-liners by putting 
a halt to political reform, stalling moves towards decisive economic refom1 and 
leading to the indefinite postponement of elections. This would delay any steps 
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towards a dialogue and rapprochement with the US until the turbulent political 
atmosphere settled. In such a case however, it is possible that a strongman, 
appealing to nationalist sentiments, could seize power in a coup d'etat, quell the 
turmoil and then move decisively to normalise relations with the US. 
Another tactic the hard-l iners could use to derail any prospects of a dialogue 
would be a terrorist attack on American or Israeli interests. This would sour the 
atmosphere so much that Iran could even be at risk of retaliatory military strikes. 
The fact that Khatami did not have prior knowledge of or authorise the attack 
would do little to mollify the Americans and Israelis. In such a case, perhaps the 
only course of action open to Kbatami to regain credibility in the eyes of the US 
and Israel would be to arrest and try the perpetrators. Extradition would be out 
of the question. However, the damage to prospects for dialogue in the medium 
term would have been already done. If such an attack occurred after the Iranians 
commenced dialogue with the Americans, then there would be a better chance for 
damage control , provided the Kbatami administration immediately condemned the 
attack and undertook to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
IfKbatami consolidates his power sufficiently to achieve internal agreementto a 
dialogue before the end of the Clinton term, it is conceivable that a timetable 
could be agreed on nornlalisation, but it would be very unlikely to occur until 
after the beginningof the new US administration in January 2001. The Iranian 
side would probably be reluctant to deal with a lame duck presidency and the 
presidential race will make bold unilateral foreign policy initiatives difficult for 
the current US administration. The new US administration, particularly if it is a 
Republican one, would probably be reluctant to make normalisation with Iran one 
of its first foreign policy initiatives, given the difficulty of carrying the Congress 
along. An opportunity for decisive movement will be presented by the expiry of 
the ILSA legislation in August 2001. This could be the catalyst for the new US 
administration, whether Democratic or Republican, to overhaul its [ran policy, 
prompting Iran to agree to talk. Normalisation could then be achieved within 
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another year, with understandings, if not resolution, reached on all outstanding 
issues. 
Long Term Prospects 
I define long term as three to ten years for the purposes of this analysis. To deal 
with " long term" as a totally open-ended time frame would render analysis 
meaningless, given my basic premise that eventual normalisation is inevitable, 
based on respective national interest. I assess that prospects for normalisation are 
excellent within my defined " long tem1" time frame. 
Extrapolating on the trends outlined under the medium term scenarios, it is clear 
that the march of time will assist the environment for normalisation. The Iranian 
revolution is maturing and there is a social evolution taking place that is not 
dependent on the personage of Khatami or any other individual. In any case, 
Khatami is likely to be in power another six years and any successor is likely to 
reflect a similar or even more reformist agenda. As earlier mentioned, this is 
because the Khatami agenda reflects the evolutionary process underway towards 
a more open society. Even in the case of a major upheaval in Iran, a terrorist 
attack against US and Israeli interests, or an overthrow of the regime, the natural 
evolution of the system cannot be stopped. Certainly such an upheaval or 
sabotage following Khatami 's second term, particularly if it occurred before Iran 
had agreed to a dialogue, could delay normalisation beyond my ten-year time 
frame. But that scenario is unlikely, given the political evolution taking place. 
Another factor helping prospects for normalisation in the long tem1 is increasing 
globalisation and the communications revolution, breaking down borders and 
creating inter-dependencies. In this environment continuing estrangement is 
increasingly unsustainable for both countries. 
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If, as I have argued, the prospects of Iran agreeing to a dialogue are good in the 
medium tenn, then it is logical to conclude that the prospects of nom1alisation in 
the long term are excellent. Iran's agreeing to a dialogue to iron out differences is 
the crucial tum in the road, which then will inevitably lead to nonnalisation, no 
matter how difficult and protracted the rapprochement process becomes. 
100 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books and Journals (in alphabetical order by author) 
Amuzegar, Jahangir: "Iran's Economy and the US Sanctions", Middle East Journal 51-2, Spring 
1997 
Clawson, Patrick; Eisenstadt, Michael; Kanovsky, Eliyahu and Menashri, David: Iran Under 
Khatami: A Political, Economic and Military Assessment (Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, Washington, 1998) 
DeSuttcr, Paul a: Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring [ranian Use of NBC Weapons (National 
Defense University Press, Washington, 1997) 
Djerjian, Edward P: "The Prospects for US-Iranian Relations" Middle East Insight XI:5 , (July-
August 1995) 4-5 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report - [ran (ETU, London, First Quarter 1999) 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. and Hinnebusch, Raymond: Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System (Routledge, London , 1997) 
Future Alliances International , Country Intelligence Unit, Bethesda, Maryland, [ran Quarterly 
Report, Volume 1:3 (Summer 1998) 
Hopkirk, Peter: The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha America 
Inc, New York, 1992) 
Huntington, Samuel: The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of th e World Order, (Simon 
& Schuster, New York, 1996) 
Katzman, Kenneth: "Beyond Dual Containment Revisited" Middle East [might XlII:S, 
(September-October 1998) 4-6 
Kemp, Geoffrey: America and [ran -Road Maps and Realism, (Nixon Center, Washington, 
1998) 
Kemp, Geoffrey: Forever Enemies? (Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1994) 
Kavoossi , Masoud: "A Mid-Tenn Evaluation of the Khatami Administration", Middle East 
[might XIV:2 , (March-April 1999) 10-12 
Khatami, Mohammad: Hope and Challenge (Binghamton University, New York, 1998) 
Khatami, Mohammad: Liberty and Development (Binghamton University, Ncw York, 1998) 
Lichtblau, John 1-1: " Dual Containmcnt and U.S. Sanctions Policy", Middle East InSight XIV: 
(May-June 1999) 57-58 
Litwak, Robert: Sources of [nter-State Conflict, (International In si titute for Strategic Studies, 
publishcd by Gower, Aldcrshot, UK, 1981) 
]01 
I" 
Mahallati, Mohammad: " Referendum for Change" in Irall 's ELections: Implications for us 
Policy (Middle East Institute, Washington, 1997) 11-1 3 
Melhem, Hisham: "Regional Perspectives: Khatami and Abdullah Visit the U.S.: Has a Hint of 
Convergence Emerged?" Middle East Insight XI1l:6 (November-December 1998) 4-8 
Menas Associates: Iran Focus , (Norfolk, UK, December 1997 - June 1999) 
Nader, George A: "Interview with President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanj ani" MiddLe East Illsight 
Xl:5 , (July-August 1995) 7-14 
Ney, Rep. Bob: "America and Iran: The Need to Talk", MiddLe East Insight XIII: 4 (May-June 
1998) 9-10 
Sadowski, Yahya: Scuds or Butter? - The Political Economy of Arms ControL in the Middle 
East, (The Brookings Institute, Washington, 1993) 
Sick, Gary: All Fall Down, (Random House, New York, 1985) 
Wright, Robyn: III the Name of God, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1989) 
Selected Media Articles (in chronological order) 
Jehl, Douglas: " Iran Leader Extends Hand to Americans", New York Tim es, 15 December, 1997, 
18 
Wright, Robin : "President Takes Hi s Message to America - via CNN", Los Allgeles Tilll es, 8 
January, 1998 
"US Becoming Isolated by Anti- Iran Pol icy", Tehran lrall News 15 January, 1998 
"Khamenei Rejects Dialogue with US - Friday Prayer Address", Voice of the Islamic Republic of 
lrall, 16 January, 1998 
"President's Message to American People: Sign oflran' s Strength", Tehran Kar va Kargar, 7 
February, 1998 
"Iran Urges International Cooperation against Terrorism", Rome Ansa 2 March, 1998 
"Commentary", Tehran lomhuri-ye Eslami, 14 September, 1998 
" Khatami Address to the UN General Assembly", Tehran lRlB TV, 21 September, 1998 
"Clinton Address to the UN General Assembly", Tehran IRNA, 22 September, 1998 
"Ministry Urged to Explain Presence of US Team in Iran", Tehran l omhuri-ye Eslami, 21 
November, 1998 
"US ' Tourists' Took Albrigh t 'Message' to Tehran", London AI-Sharq AI-Awsar, 3 December, 
1998 
''Kharrazi interview to Abrar" Agence France Press, Tehran, 8 November, 1998 
"Kamal Kharrazi Interview", [RIB TV, Tehran, 17 December ,1998 
"Foreign Mini stry'S Fai lures under Velayati", Tehran Khordad, 22 December, 1998 
102 
"Allocation of Budget to Fight American Plot is Welcome", Tehran Times, I FebIUary, 1999 
"Ayatollah Montazeri Letter on US-Iran Relations", Tehran Khordad, 6 FebIUary, 1999 
"Javad Larijani on Iran-US Ties", Tehran Sobh-e Emrooz, 8 March, 1999 
"Salam Views Year's Foreign Policy", Tehran Salam, 18 March, 1999 
"Iran-Defense: Iran carries out test of surface-to-air mi ssile", AFP Internet, 14 April, 1999 
"Clinton Remarks a Step Towards Realism", Tehran Emnlz, 17 April, 1999 
"US Must Take Practical Steps to End Hostility" Tehran Kayhan International, 19 April, 1999 
"US Condemns Iran Sentencing", Associated Press Internet, 21 April, 1999 
"Iran Slams US Terrorism Accusations", Reuters Internet, I May, 1999 
"Saudi Defence Minister Interview", London Al-Hayah, 5 May, 1999 
"Kamal Kharrazi Interview", Tehran Kayhan International, 8 May, 1999 
"The Conservatives, Mohajerani 's Impeachment and Detente with America", Tehran Neshat, 10 
May, 1999 
" Khatami Meets Palestinian Groups, Reiterates Support", Tehran IRIB TV, 14 May, 1999 
"US Assails Khatami on Meeting Rejectionists", Iran TV, 15 May, 1999 
"Khatami's Domestic, Foreign Initiatives", London al-Hawadith, 21 May, 1999 
"Khatami Interview", Qatar al-lazirah Space Channel TV, Doha, 23 May, 1999 
"Iranian Foreign Ministry Comment", Islamic Republic News Agency Internet, 26 May, 1999 
"Kamal Kharrazi Interview", Cairo al-Ahram al- 'Arabi, 29 May, 1999 
"Khatami Comments on Iran' s Low Defense Budget", Tehran IRNA, 31 May, 1999 
"Saudi Crown Prince on Iran' s Defence " , Reuters Internet, I June, 1999 
"Larijani on Relations with Britain , US", Tehran Neshat, 6 June, 1999 
"Espionage, Religion , and Politics" Irall Report: Radio Free Europe News Service, Prague, 21 
June, 1999 
"Iran-US: Iranian Foreign Ministry Reaction to Indyk Conunents" IRNA, Illt ernet, 23 June, 
1999 
"Loans to Iran Stall After AlTest of Jews" Washington Post, 23 June, 1999, 18 
Wright, Robin: "New Generation ofIranians Grabs Rei ns of Revol ution", Los Angeles Times, 14 
Jul y, 1999 
" Irani an Ministry Issues Statement on Recent Riots" IRIB Television News, Tehran 18 July, 
1999 
103 
i., 
Transcripts of Speeches and Official Statements and Reports (in chronological order) 
"Khatami ,'s Inaugural Speech to Majles", Diplomatic Sources, Tehran, 4 August, 1997 
"US State Department Press Briefing", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 6 January, 1998 
"Khatami CNN Interview", Diplomatic Sources, Tehran, 7 January, 1998 
"US State Department Press Briefing", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 8 January, 1998 
"President Clinton's Remarks on the Occasion of Id al-Fi tr", White House Press Office, 
Washington, 29 January, 1998 
"Secretary of State Albright ' s Address to Asia Society in New York" internet, 
www.asiasocietv.org 17 June, 1998 
"Report of the Congressional Commission to assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States", (Rumsfeld Commission Report), Internet, wwwalaskapaciOc.edu 15 Jul y, 1998 
"Clinton Remarks at White House", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 23 July, 1998 
" Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement", Diplomatic Sources, Tehran, 8 August, 1998 
"Kharrazi Address to Asia Society in New York", Internet www.asiasocietv.org 28 September, 
1998 
"US State Department Press Briefing", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 9 November, 1998 
"US State Department Press Briefing", Diplomatic Sources, Washington , 14 December, 1998 
"US State Department Press Briefi ng", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 6 January, 1999 
"Cyrus Vance Address to Asia Society in New York", Internet, wWlI'.asiasocietyorrr 13 
January, 1999 
"Albright Comments at Center for National Policy", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 21 
January, 1999 
"US State Department Press Briefi ng", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 1 March, 1999 
" US State Department Press Briefing", Diplomatic Sources, Washington, 2 March, 1999 
"US State Department Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998", Diplomatic Sources, 
Washington, April 1999 
Martin Indyk Address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York", Internet, 
wWlI'.c{i·.com 22 April , 1999 
" Indyk's 8 Junc Testimony before the House International Relations Commi ttee", Mideast 
Mirror Internet, Washington, 9 June, 1999 
"Statemcnt No. I 79", Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN, New Yark, 14 June, 1999 
104 
